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I. Introduction 
Look up. Domestic unmanned aircraft have arrived and may 
be coming to a city near you.1  
The drone revolution promises to increase substantially the 
ability of law enforcement to serve and protect their jurisdictions. 
Drones are unique because they often lack the technical 
limitations and restrictive costs of manned aircraft.2 Their 
potential for a positive impact on society is substantial, but 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Michael McAuliff, FBI’s Robert Mueller: Drones Are in Use in 
America, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 19, 2013), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2013/06/19/robert-mueller-drones_n_3466400.html?ncid=edlinkusaolp 
00000003#slide=592888 (last visited June 21, 2013) (“FBI Director Robert 
Mueller revealed Wednesday that the bureau uses drones to conduct 
surveillance on U.S. soil.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Mueller testified to Congress on June 19, 2013 about the FBI’s drone program. 
Id. He added that FBI policies regarding drone use and privacy are still in the 
initial stages of development. Id. Police have made at least one arrest on 
American soil in which drone surveillance played an acknowledged and 
important role. See Edward Humes, Eyes in the Sky, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Aug. 
2013, at 21 (“Sheriff Kelly Janke said the Predator overflight—which would not 
have required a warrant if performed by a piloted craft—helped deputies stage a 
safe, nonviolent arrest.”). 
 2. See generally discussion infra Part II.B. 
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drones also carry a potential for abuse. The technology can 
outstrip certain constitutional protections and case law governing 
naked-eye aerial observation by police. A possible reassurance 
may be that police have no desire to track and observe average 
Americans.3 But the danger of abuse may already be realized.4 
Indeed, the revelations surrounding the National Security 
Agency’s surveillance programs underscore the lengths to which 
the federal government will go to use technology in the pursuit of 
fighting crime and terrorism and that such technology is subject 
to abuse.5 
Consider the following hypothetical. City police launch three 
drones from a municipal airport just after dawn. Drone 1 
operates at 10,000 feet, carries downward-looking cameras, and 
can remain aloft for twelve continuous hours to follow targets 
below. It will stay overhead in the public airways to track and 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Tim Redmond, Alameda County’s Spy Drone, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION (EFF) (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.eff.org/mention/alameda-countys-
spy-drone (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (“Sheriff Gregory Ahern has insisted in 
public statements and in communications to the Board of Supervisors that he 
wants to use said drone only for search and rescue missions, disaster response, 
and . . . [observing] wildfires.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 4. See Mark Mazzetti, The Drone Zone, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, at 
MM32 (July 8, 2012) (describing the author’s experience as a member of the 
media granted access to the Air Force’s primary drone pilot training center at 
Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico). Mazzetti details training practices that 
may include tracking unsuspecting motorists on the roads below: 
A white S.U.V. traveling along a highway adjacent to the base came 
into the cross hairs in the center of the screen and was tracked as it 
headed south along the desert road. When the S.U.V. drove out of the 
picture, the drone began following another car. 
“Wait, you guys practice tracking enemies by using civilian cars?” a 
reporter asked. One Air Force officer responded that this was only a 
training mission, and then the group was quickly hustled out of the 
room. 
 5. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, U.S. Surveillance Architecture Includes 
Collection of Revealing Internet, Phone Metadata, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 
15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-surveillance-archi 
tecture-includes-collection-of-revealing-internet-phone-metadata/2013/06/15/e9b 
f004a-d511-11e2-b05f-3ea3f0e7bb5a_story.html (last visited June 21, 2013) 
(describing the National Security Agency’s clandestine surveillance 
architecture, the full extent of which came to light in May and June, 2013) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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identify the individuals coming and going from an open courtyard 
within an estate. Assume that Drone 1 is completely 
imperceptible to naked-eye observation from the ground. 
Drone 2 is small and operates only at low altitudes where 
larger, manned aircraft cannot fly. It will target the individuals 
mentioned above by hovering silently at varying distances from 
the house (some at fifteen feet over a field, some above a public 
street, etc.). Drone 3 is also small, but travels to the scene of a 
forest fire on the edge of town. City police have equipped these 
smaller drones with a variety of cameras and listening devices, 
none of which amplify sensory inputs above normal human 
perception. Additionally, the smaller drones are equipped with 
navigational cameras that capture a continuous feed of video 
from start to finish. If a policeman were at these unusual drone 
flight altitudes, he would hear and see exactly as these drones do. 
If present law is applied, are the targeted individuals 
protected from the warrantless observations made by these 
drones?6 Now assume that their general capabilities have become 
commonly known, much like those of a typical police helicopter 
today. How might the law vary for each drone under these 
assumptions, if and when police rapidly expand their use of 
drones? The answers to these questions about Drones 1, 2, and 3 
are worth knowing. 
In general, the Fourth Amendment7 protects Americans from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.8 The home has long been 
                                                                                                     
 6. Under current law these warrantless observations may not be barred 
by the Fourth Amendment because they do not penetrate a home’s private 
interior and they were made from aircraft flying at a legal altitude (presuming 
that the FAA has specifically approved Drones 2 and 3–4 for safe use in 
alleyways). See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Unmanned Aerial Exposure: Civil 
Liability Concerns Arising from Domestic Law Enforcement Employment of 
Unmanned Aerial Systems, 85 N.D. L. REV. 623, 642 (2009) (“Homeowners have 
no expectation to privacy with respect to that which can be viewed from above 
during legal passage by aircraft.” (quotations omitted)). “Where a [drone] 
captures images that could have been obtained from civilian aircraft travelling 
in a legally authorized manner, privacy claims are limited. Consumers lack a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to areas already exposed to 
civilian overflights.” Id. (quotations omitted); see generally discussion infra Part 
II.C. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 8. See id. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
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guarded from unwarranted intrusion.9 Expectations of privacy 
are most reasonable under these general standards when 
intrusion occurs in the home and its surrounding curtilage.10 
Consequently, privacy safeguards are strongest in this setting.11  
Police intrusions into an individual’s home are presumptively 
searches, and without a warrant, they are presumptively 
invalid.12 But even in the residential setting, gaps in legal 
protection exist, especially as new technology emerges. Though 
the specter of continuous drone surveillance may threaten 
societal notions of what the Fourth Amendment protects, a 
destruction of privacy is not inevitable. 
                                                                                                     
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .”). Available case law tends to focus on two aspects of this 
constitutional protection: whether a search occurred, and if so, whether that 
search was reasonable. See infra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing 
present case law regarding aerial observation by police). Some scholars 
maintain that Fourth Amendment protections, as applied by the courts, amount 
to little more than enforcement of a property right to exclude others. See Orin S. 
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–13 (2004) (arguing that an 
expectation of privacy is only held to be reasonable “when it is backed by a right 
to exclude borrowed from real property law”). 
 9. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (stating that 
the Fourth Amendment holds sacred “the right of a man to retreat into his own 
home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion”); Kerr, supra 
note 8, at 810 (“A homeowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
home.”). 
 10. See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 (stating that the Fourth Amendment 
holds sacred “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free 
from unreasonable government intrusion”); Amelia L. Diedrich, Secure in Their 
Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the Aggravation of the Poverty Exception to 
the Fourth Amendment, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 297, 304 (2011) (stating that 
the Supreme Court and lower courts have consistently recognized that people 
have the highest expectations of privacy when in their homes). 
 11. See Diedrich, supra note 10, at 304 (stating that the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that “physical entry of the home is the ‘chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed’” (quoting United States v. U.S. 
District Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972))). Diedrich links 
the concept of curtilage—the intimate area immediately surrounding a house—
to the Court’s special emphasis of protection from Fourth Amendment violation. 
See Diedrich, supra note 10, at 304 (relating curtilage to previously adjudicated 
Fourth Amendment matters). 
 12. See id. at 304–05 (discussing the strength of privacy law in the context 
of the home). 
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Currently, when police observe from the air, courts will 
inquire whether the aircraft had a legal right to be flying there 
and whether a reasonable man should have expected that his 
activities were exposed to public viewing from the air.13 Some of 
these inquiries likely now protect Americans from much drone 
observation,14 but issues remain.  
Widespread police operation of drones has the potential to 
upend current Supreme Court precedent.15 While previous cases 
have held that “mere visual observation does not constitute a 
search,”16 that law is, in part, predicated on assumptions of 
resource scarcity that will cease to be true in the face of 
widespread police use of drones.17 
Concerned members of Congress and civil libertarians tend 
to focus on the broad societal “implications of increased [drone] 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–51 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(concluding that police observation made “from a public vantage point where 
[the aircraft has] a right to be” does not require a search warrant so long as a 
reasonable man would not have “expected that his [curtilage] was protected 
from public or official observation”). 
 14. For example, a police drone that hovers over a property at ten feet, 
peering through walls into the intimate details of a house and using 
extrasensory perceptive devices would be a fairly clear-cut Fourth Amendment 
violation under present case law. See id. at 450–51 (concluding that aerial 
observations, made by officers in a helicopter hovering at a legal and reasonable 
altitude, of the interior of a greenhouse within residential curtilage was not a 
protected search by the Fourth Amendment, but that the outcome might be 
different if the altitude was “contrary to law”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (ruling that the use of sense-enhancing technology not in 
general public use to view intimate interior contents of a home was a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (discussing how GPS tracking technology presents a problem for 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because it is “cheap in comparison to 
conventional surveillance techniques” and it “proceeds surreptitiously, [so] it 
evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: 
limited police resources and community hostility” (quotations omitted)). 
 16. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31–32 (discussing aerial observation precedent). 
 17. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (discussing how GPS tracking technology 
presents a problem for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because it is “cheap in 
comparison to conventional surveillance techniques” and it “proceeds 
surreptitiously, [so] it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law 
enforcement practices: limited police resources and community hostility” 
(quotations omitted)). 
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use including potential privacy implications.”18 In the face of new 
legislation and confusion in the lower courts, the Supreme Court 
will likely have new opportunities to revisit its decisions 
governing aerial observation. Before evaluating legislative or 
judicial solutions, however, the upcoming changes to drone policy 
must be outlined so that the precise vulnerabilities of existing 
jurisprudence can be appreciated. 
The novel and widespread use of drones will likely impact 
many areas of the law.19 This Note considers a small slice of 
relevant jurisprudence, mainly how courts should treat law 
enforcement observations made by drones of American citizens or 
their property in or near the domestic residence setting.20 Privacy 
threats will no doubt originate from sources other than law 
enforcement entities.21 In order to preserve a manageable scope of 
review, this Note will not address the significant privacy threats 
posed by privately operated drones, drones flying near the border, 
or those used against foreign nationals in the United States. But 
the primary threat to the average American’s privacy arguably 
does not come from some of these sources.22 The routine use of 
                                                                                                     
 18. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-981, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 
SYSTEMS: MEASURING PROGRESS AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PRIVACY CONCERNS 
WOULD FACILITATE INTEGRATION INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 3 (2012) 
[hereinafter GAO DRONE REPORT]. 
 19. See generally Rapp, supra note 6, at 623 (listing ground damage, air-to-
air collisions, communications interference, constitutional rights and privacy, 
landowner rights, environmental concerns, piracy and governmental immunity 
as issues that might arise with increased drone usage). 
 20. This Note considers the situation of residential curtilage because “[o]n 
the public street, or in any other public place, [an individual] has no right to be 
alone, and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than follow him about.” 
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 391 (1960) (discussing 
privacy in the context of tort law). The idea of privacy is inherently dependent 
on mental conceptions of what information and conduct should reasonably 
remain out of the public sphere. See id. at 392 (“It appears obvious that the 
interest protected by this branch of the tort is primarily a mental one.”). 
 21. See John Villasenor, Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 498 (2013) [hereinafter 
Villasenor, Observations] (describing non-law enforcement threats to privacy 
from the use of drones, such as the use of the technology by private individuals). 
 22. After all, there are thousands of federal, state, and local law 
enforcement departments that would stand to gain from the use of drone 
technology. 
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drones by police would, under present law, constitute a more 
serious threat to privacy if the evidence gathered therefrom is 
permitted to be used in court or stored indefinitely. 
Rapidly evolving drone technology raises two primary 
privacy concerns in the law enforcement setting: (1) that the 
privacy rights of an individual will be violated; and (2) that the 
presence of numerous lingering drones overhead will threaten 
privacy in society as a whole by providing police with an 
Orwellian omniscience.23 These two distinct privacy threats are 
correlated, because the remedies for one problem will indirectly 
alleviate the other.24 Therefore, both individual and societal 
impacts must be considered when attempting to craft solutions to 
the problems that drones pose. 
Part II of this Note discusses drone capabilities and provides 
background on FAA drone regulations prior to the 2012 
Reauthorization bill. Part III explores recent legislation that will 
expand the domestic use of drones. Part IV overviews Supreme 
Court aerial-observation cases and reveals constitutional gaps 
that may prompt the Supreme Court to revisit precedent in the 
new context of drones. Part IV also covers the widening 
divergence in the application of aerial observation case law. 
Lastly, Part V discusses solutions, including currently pending 
legislation, and how the courts should respond to safeguard 
against improper drone surveillance. 
II. Background 
To understand what issues and solutions exist, we must 
survey the contextual landscape. Recent changes to the drone 
licensing structure, combined with evolving drone capabilities, 
                                                                                                     
 23. This broader privacy is difficult to define, because it is dependent on 
mental conceptions of what information and conduct should reasonably remain 
out of the public sphere. See Prosser, supra note 20, at 392 (“It appears obvious 
that the interest protected by this branch of the tort is primarily a mental one.”). 
 24. Legislatures and courts have different roles to play when it comes to 
protecting Americans from privacy violations. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 862 
(discussing the roles that courts play in the development of the law). But both 
entities must act affirmatively to best protect Americans from the multi-faceted 
privacy threat posed by drones. Id. 
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could allow the police to fly circles around Fourth Amendment 
law. This Part explores the capabilities of drones and the process 
by which the FAA approves them for use. 
A. Familiar Concept, Foreign Sight 
Drone technology burst onto the public scene during 
America’s relatively recent military involvements in Afghanistan 
and Iraq,25 but remotely controlled aircraft have been around in 
one form or another for nearly one hundred years.26 Indeed, 
drones have long been a part of public imagination through works 
of literature and science fiction.27 Yet their presence has often 
seemed distant. Now, rather than on a far-off planet or above a 
foreign battlefield, the next stop for drones is directly above 
American backyards.  
Drones go by many names,28 but they are essentially aircraft 
remotely controlled by pilots on the ground, by preprogrammed 
instruction, or by pilots in chase aircraft.29 Dozens of agencies 
                                                                                                     
 25. See Paul McBride, Beyond Orwell: The Application of Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems in Domestic Surveillance Operations, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 627, 
630 (2009) (describing the recent public consciousness of drone technology in the 
military theater). 
 26. See id. (“At least as early as World War I, military theorists recognized 
the value and potential of being able to remotely direct unmanned aircraft in 
combat settings.” (citation omitted)). 
 27. See, e.g., STAR WARS: EPISODE V—THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm 
1980) (depicting drone scouts on a distant, alien ice planet); GEORGE ORWELL, 
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 2 (Plume Printing 2003) (1949) (describing a drone-like 
action in the following scene: “In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down 
between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a blue-bottle, and darted away 
again with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping in people’s 
windows”). 
 28. For example, the U.S. government has labeled them unmanned 
aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, and drones at various times. See Pub. L. 
No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 72 (enacted Feb. 14, 2012) (codified in scattered sections of 
49 U.S.C.) (defining statutory terms); McBride, supra note 25, at 628 (“Although 
widely known as UAVs or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, the modern preference is 
to redefine the technology as UAS [Unmanned Aircraft Systems].”). For ease of 
reference, this Note will use “drones” to describe these aircraft. 
 29. See GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at 1 (“[Drone] aircraft do not 
carry a pilot onboard but instead operate on pre-programmed routes and by 
following commands from pilot-operated ground control stations.”). 
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have already applied for and use drones to perform agency 
functions.30 Drone certificate holders presently include more than 
one hundred agencies, universities, companies, and 
organizations.31 Those groups include the U.S. Air Force, 
numerous local police and sheriff’s departments, the California 
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, universities and 
community colleges, the Department of Agriculture, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Raytheon 
Company, and Blackwater Airships LLC.32 From that sample of 
interested parties alone, drone technology’s economic and life-
saving usefulness appears limited only by the imagination. 
Wirelessly controlled airplanes marketed as “spy drones” 
dotted the shelves during the 2012 holiday shopping season at 
                                                                                                     
 30. In April 2012, for example, the FAA released two lists of drone 
certificates pursuant to the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request for information covering the agency’s present 
and past certificate authorizations. See Jennifer Lynch, FAA Releases Lists of 
Drone Certificates—Many Questions Left Unanswered, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION (EFF) (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 2012/04/faa-
releases-its-list-drone-certificates-leaves-many-questions-unanswered (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Lynch, FAA Release] (detailing the contents 
of the FAA’s document release) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). More recently, the California National Guard has employed drones to 
scout a massive wildfire near Yosemite National Park in the summer of 2013. 
See California National Guard Launches Drone to Scout Yosemite-area Wildfire, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Aug. 28, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-
08-28/national/41508049_1_u-s-forest-service-angeles-national-forest-drone (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2013) (“Firefighters battling the giant wildfire burning in the 
Sierra Nevada added a California National Guard Predator drone to their 
arsenal Wednesday to give them almost immediate views of any portion of the 
flames chewing through rugged forests in and around Yosemite National Park.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 31. See GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at 16, 43 (detailing the FAA 
partnerships with various universities and the federal agencies that have been 
granted authorizations to operate drones). 
 32. See FAA List of Certificates of Authorizations, EFF, https://www. 
eff.org/document/faa-list-certificates-authorizations-coas (last visited Jan. 13, 
2013) (listing all approved, expired, and disapproved Certificates of 
Authorization by the FAA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
For an interactive map of where domestic drones have been authorized to 
operate, see Jennifer Lynch, Newly Released Drone Records Reveal Extensive 
Military Flights in US, EFF (Dec. 5, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/ 
12/newly-released-drone-records-reveal-extensive-military-flights-us (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Lynch, Newly Released] (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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major U.S. retailers.33 The number of anticipated uses for 
commercial and private drones seems to be matched in quantity 
only by the number of news articles fearing their misuse.34 Pleas 
for caution and safeguards are understandable, given the types of 
presently available drones and the knowledge that technology 
tends to shrink size and expand capabilities over time. 
                                                                                                     
 33. See, e.g., Parrot AR Drone 2.0, http://ardrone.parrot.com/parrot-ar-
drone/en/where-to-buy/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) (listing the points of sale in 
the United States for the Parrot AR Drone 2.0) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). These devices are little more than model airplanes with 
cameras, but their interconnectivity with smart phones enables users to interact 
with the aircraft in new ways. 
 34. For information describing the important new uses of drones, see infra 
notes 29–36 and accompanying text. See also Humes, supra note 1, at 19 (“[T]he 
goal is to curtail the possible abuses of drone technology while also trying to 
aggressively exploit its potential in such areas as farming, firefighting, and 
search-and-rescue operations.”); Sarah Kellog, Drones: Coming to the Skies Near 
You, WASHINGTON LAWYER July–Aug. 2013, at 22 (“[T]he devolution of [drones] 
from military/intelligence tools into peaceful domestic products has been 
proceeding at a rapid pace.”); Sean Gallagher, Look to the Skies: Is It Time to 
Stop Worrying and Love the Drone?, ARSTECHNICA.COM (Apr. 8, 2012), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/04/look-to-the-skies-is-it-time-to-stop-
worrying-and-love-the-drone/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Gallagher, 
Look to the Skies] (reporting that drones have such potential to revolutionize 
flight and that they “could have a potentially huge impact on society and 
culture—in both a positive and negative sense”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). For articles describing the dangers drones pose to 
privacy, see, e.g., Sean Gallagher, Here Comes Skynet: Army Drones Almost 
Ready to Share Sky with Airlines, ARSTECHNICA.COM (July 5, 2012), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/here-comes-skynet-army-drones-
almost-ready-to-share-sky-with-airlines/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (describing 
the objection of privacy advocates with the ACLU and other organizations) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Lynch, FAA Release, supra note 
30 (detailing the contents of the FAA’s document release); Jennifer Lynch, These 
Drones Are Made for Watchin’, EFF (Aug. 16, 2012), https://www. 
eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/these-drones-are-made-watchin (last visited Mar. 7, 
2013) [hereinafter Lynch, These Drones] (emphasizing the ease with which 
drones can spy on the population) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Greg McNeal, A Primer on Domestic Drones: Legal, Policy, and Privacy 
Implications, FORBES.COM, Apr. 10, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
Gregorymcneal/2012/04/10/a-primer-on-domestic-drones-and-privacy-implications/ 
(“[D]rones might raise unique privacy concerns because of their ability to gather 
information from a particular ‘vantage point’ which is distinguishable from the 
data we accumulate through our cellular phones or Internet searches.”). 
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B. Drones Are a Unique Search Technology 
The military quickly realized that in a rugged country like 
Afghanistan, drones are particularly useful to perform dangerous, 
behind-the-lines surveillance missions and hunt suspected 
terrorists.35 The technology’s military desirability boils down to 
simple economics and safety—operated from distant facilities in 
the United States, the drones keep costs down and airmen safe.36 
Military and civilian leaders have praised drones for freeing up 
resources and performing long missions without stopping to 
refuel or change pilots, and rightly so.37 Those benefits now 
beckon domestically with a renewed energy, but they may not 
arrive without collateral privacy consequences. 
Drones vary widely in size and capabilities; some are tiny 
versions of blimps or helicopters,38 while others are larger and 
have a more traditional fixed-wing aircraft profile.39 And with 
variety comes versatility.40 Many drones can hover or circle for 
extremely long periods of time,41 can be outfitted with a variety of 
                                                                                                     
 35. See McBride, supra note 25, at 634–35 (discussing drone military 
capabilities). 
 36. See Gallagher, Look to the Skies, supra note 34 (describing the benefits 
of drones to the military). 
 37. See McBride, supra note 25, at 634–39 (examining the advantages and 
uses of domestic drone technology). 
 38. See GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at 5 (“Small [drones] typically 
weigh less than 55 pounds, fly below 400 feet above ground level, can stay 
airborne for several hours, and can be used for reconnaissance, inspection, and 
surveillance.” (quotations omitted)). 
 39. See id. (“Large [drones] generally fly at altitudes up to or greater than 
60,000 feet, some can remain airborne for multiple days, and are generally used 
for the purposes of surveillance, data gathering, and communications relay.”). 
 40. For a thorough exploration of drone technology and uses, see generally 
Villasenor, supra note 21. 
 41. See Troy Roberts, On the Radar: Government Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles and Their Effect on Public Privacy Interests from Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence and Legislative Policy Perspectives, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 491, 499 
(2009) (describing the ability of drones to stay aloft for hours or days at a time); 
Richard Whittle, How It Works: Laser Beaming Recharges UAV in Flight, 
POPULAR MECHANICS (July 28, 2012), available at http://www.popular 
mechanics.com/technology/aviation/news/how-it-works-laser-beaming-recharges-
uav-in-flight-11091133 (describing a system to charge drones by means of a 
ground laser with the capability of keeping them aloft indefinitely). 
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cameras and sensory equipment,42 and make little noise or 
appearance in the sky.43 Some are larger than general aviation 
planes and cost millions of dollars,44 while others can fit in a 
backpack (or the palm of a hand) and cost less than a squad car.45  
Drones are ideal for search-and-rescue missions or operations 
in which there is vast territory to cover. Best of all for law 
enforcement and emergency personnel, smaller drones can 
squeeze into spaces too tight or perform tasks too dangerous for a 
manned aircraft.46 One can easily imagine a squadron of cheap, 
light drones combing a vast expanse of forest for lost hikers or the 
beginnings of a forest fire. 
It is perhaps durational flexibility that makes drones most 
attractive to organizations operating within a narrow budget. A 
manned helicopter or plane can only stay aloft for a few hours 
before refueling. Additionally, manned aircraft are typically 
                                                                                                     
 42. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 492–97 (describing the ability of both 
military and civilian drones to be outfitted with a variety of sensory equipment). 
Roberts highlights the onboard sensors that drones have proven capable of 
wielding effectively, including thermal and visual camera systems, electro-
optical sensors, ocean color sensors, ozone sensors, gas chronograph, passive 
microwave vertical sounders, and wall-penetrating technology. See id. at 498–99 
(describing the onboard sensory capabilities of drones, including “highly 
classified technology that allows observers to see through walls”). Roberts 
envisions that police departments would use many of these capabilities for 
“criminal surveillance, situational awareness, hot pursuit, accident or crime 
scene forensics, and hazardous material reconnaissance.” Id. at 498. 
 43. See id. at 494–95 (“[Drones] are less noisy, cumbersome, and 
conspicuous than conventional manned aircraft.”). 
 44. See id. at 494–95 (“[Drones] can come in all sizes, shapes, and 
capabilities, ranging from the size of a softball to the size of a full size aircraft.” 
(quotations omitted)). 
 45. See, e.g., Gary Martin and Viveca Novak, Push to Step Up Domestic Use 
of Drones, SF Gate (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.sfgate.com/nation/article/Push-
to-step-up-domestic-use-of-drones-4064482.php#page-1 (last visited Dec. 22, 
2012) (describing the capabilities of many different types of drones) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); McBride, supra note 25, at 634–35 
(same);  Rapp, supra note 6, at 624–26 (same); Roberts, supra note 41, at 493–97 
(outlining the unique capabilities of advanced drones). It is safe to say that by 
the time of this Note’s publication, even these examples will likely be surpassed 
by newer capabilities and technologies. 
 46. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 492 (“[Drones] are well suited for dull, 
dirty, or dangerous missions that are instrumental in military operations.” 
(quotations omitted)). 
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larger, require several people, and can cost hundreds of dollars 
per hour to operate.47 
Many drones are much simpler than manned aircraft to fly. 
As an example, a user can control the tiny, low-altitude Parrot 
AR Drone 2.0 and view (on an ordinary smart phone) live video it 
captures.48 A user with more substantial financial resources can 
outfit drones with a bevy of advanced sensors—facial recognition 
technology, night vision, telephoto zoom lenses, heat sensing 
technology, wall-penetrating radar, and other electromagnetic 
equipment that enhances observational capabilities well beyond 
those of the naked eye.49 Certainly, larger drones will require 
more skilled pilots and technology on the ground to be adequately 
controlled, but the advantages over costly manned aircraft are 
significant. Considering the sensory enhancement, durational 
benefits, and resource efficiency, it is small wonder that the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) anticipates that law 
enforcement will continue to expand its use of domestic drones.50  
C. Present Drone Policy 
The FAA has issued several sets of guidelines outlining its 
treatment of domestic drones.51 Prior to 2012, a rigid, 
                                                                                                     
 47. See Gallagher, Look to the Skies, supra note 34 (“[T]he Shadowhawk [a 
type of drone recently purchased by the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office] 
costs $40 an hour to operate, compared to the $500-per-hour cost of a full-sized 
helicopter.”). 
 48. See Parrot AR Drone 2.0, supra note 33 (describing the control and 
interface features of the Parrot AR Drone 2.0). 
 49. See Lynch, These Drones, supra note 34 (describing the sensory 
capabilities of a typical police drone).  
 50. See Fed. Aviation Admin., Fact Sheet—Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story. 
cfm?newsId=14153 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) [hereinafter FAA Fact Sheet] 
(“Common uses today include law enforcement, firefighting, border patrol, 
disaster relief, search and rescue, military training, and other government 
operational missions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The 
FAA has confirmed that, since 1990, “the agency has authorized limited use of 
[drones] for important missions in the public interest, such as firefighting, 
disaster relief, search and rescue, law enforcement, border patrol, military 
training and testing and evaluation.” Id. 
 51. See id. (discussing the Agency’s policies and procedures regarding 
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individualized licensing process stymied the prospect of 
widespread drone usage in the United States.52 The FAA 
approval system now employed requires careful, case-by-case 
agency evaluation of the operator’s request to use drones.53 The 
FAA also has different approval standards for drones based on 
size and capability.54 Many smaller drones, and drones operated 
recreationally as model airplanes, are currently permitted by 
regulation to operate at altitudes much lower than the minimum 
acceptable altitudes for helicopters and fixed-wing aircrafts.55  
Government users—including local law enforcement and 
public universities—may operate drones only after obtaining a 
Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) from the FAA.56 The 
COA restricts the drone operation to a defined airspace and 
“includes special provisions unique to the proposed operation.”57 
Designation of the drone as an experimental aircraft is another 
avenue for drone licensing, but public-use drones typically go 
through the more detailed COA process.58 The FAA will 
                                                                                                     
drones); Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 
Fed. Reg. 6689 (Feb. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91) (same); FED. 
AVIATION ADMIN., UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS OPERATIONS IN THE U. S. 
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM—INTERIM OPERATIONAL APPROVAL GUIDANCE 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT (2005), http://www.eoss.org/faa/AFS_400_UAS_POLICY_ 
05_01.pdf (same).  
 52. See FAA Fact Sheet, supra note 50 (detailing the process for approving 
an operator’s request to use drones). 
 53. See id. (detailing the process for approving an operator’s request to use 
drones). 
 54. For example, recreational use of unmanned aircraft is governed by FAA 
Advisory Circular 91–57, which “generally limits operations to below 400 feet 
above ground level and away from airports and air traffic.” Id. Furthermore, 
small drones weighing 4.4 pounds or less now receive special treatment and an 
accelerated approval process, subject to certain restrictions. See id. (detailing 
the approval process for small unmanned aircraft). 
 55. See id. (discussing applicable rules on model airplanes and FAA 
Advisory Circular 91–57 (June 9, 1981)). Aircraft operating under these model 
airplane provisions are only permitted to be used for recreational or personal 
purposes. Id. 
 56. See id. (detailing the process for approving an operator’s request to use 
drones). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. (“COAs are available to public entities that want to fly a [drone] 
in civil airspace.”). 
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sometimes deny COA requests, but those denials are almost 
invariably for safety-of-flight reasons, not privacy 
considerations.59 A new mandate for the expanded use of drones, 
however, will scrap the current policies of case-by-case 
authorization. 
Congress has made clear its intention to rapidly expand 
domestic drone activity. In February 2012, the legislative 
reauthorization of the FAA carried with it a requirement that 
the Agency promulgate regulations and develop a 
comprehensive plan for the integration of drones into the 
national airspace system.60 As a result, by some estimates there 
could be 30,000 or more drones operating in U.S. skies in the 
next few decades.61 The increasing law enforcement preference 
for warrantless spying techniques—for example, the Justice 
Department’s warrantless surveillance has increased 600% in 
the past decade62—may help explain why a third of the public 
                                                                                                     
 59. For example, the FAA has previously denied the Ogden Police 
Department a COA for using a nocturnal surveillance blimp drone to monitor 
high crime areas because its operation would be unsafe for the national 
aerospace system. See Letter from Dean E. Fulmer, FAA, to Chief Jon Greiner, 
Ogden Utah Police Department (Sept. 8, 2011), available at 
https://www.eff.org/document/ogden-2011-coa-status-document (describing the 
reasons for denying the police application for COA). 
 60. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 
126 Stat. 11 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (detailing 
statutory requirements and deadlines); John Villasenor and Benjamin Wittes, 
Opinion, Regulating Domestic Drones on a Deadline, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2012 
(describing the requirements of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 
2012), available at http://www. brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/04/20-
drones-wittes-villasenor. 
 61. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2010–
2030, at 48 [hereinafter FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST] (2010), http://www. 
faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/2010-2030/media/2010%20 
Forecast%20Doc.pdf. This number compares with approximately 18,000 
commercial aircraft and 230,000 general aviation aircraft that operate in the 
United States currently. See GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at 4.  
Federal agencies are planning to increase their use of UAS’s. State 
and local governments envision using UAS’s to aid in law 
enforcement and firefighting. Potential commercial uses are also 
possible, for example, in real estate photography or pipeline 
inspection. UAS’s could perform some manned aircraft missions with 
less noise and fewer emissions. 
 62. See David Kravets, Justice Department’s Warrantless Spying Increased 
600 Percent in Decade, WIRED.COM (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www. 
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fears that the use of drones by police will threaten their privacy 
interests.63 
III. The Importance of Recent Legislative Developments 
A. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 
In 2012, Congress passed the FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012,64 covering fiscal years 2011 through 2014.65 
As previously discussed, the reauthorization law carried with it a 
requirement that the Agency promulgate regulations and 
implement a comprehensive plan to “accelerate” the integration 
of drones into the national airspace system by the end of 
September 2015.66 Pursuant to that mandate, Congress 
established a series of requirements and deadlines for the FAA to 
include in its comprehensive drone plan.67 
The first phase involves the formulation of a “Comprehensive 
Plan” that requires the Agency to report to Congress on 
anticipated rulemakings,68 methods to enhance safety and phase 
                                                                                                     
wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/ warrantless-surveillance-stats/ (last visited Feb. 
17, 2013) (detailing the sharp increase in pen-register and trap-and-trace 
methods of warrantless eavesdropping) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 63. See Joan Lowy, AP-NCC Poll: A Third of the Public Fears Police Use of 
Drones for Surveillance Will Erode their Privacy, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 27, 
2012), available at http://ap-gfkpoll.com/uncategorized/our-latest-poll-findings-
13 (detailing a poll examining popular attitude toward police drone use). 
 64. Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (enacted Feb. 14, 2012) [hereinafter 
the Reauthorization] (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat. at 73. “The plan . . . shall provide for the safe 
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system 
as soon as practicable, but not later than September 30, 2015.” Id. (emphasis 
added).  
 67. See id. § 332(a), 126 Stat. at 73–74 (describing the contents of the plan, 
deadlines, and reporting requirements to Congress). To understand where the 
FAA is in meeting these deadlines as of September 2012, see GAO DRONE 
REPORT, supra note 18, at 24–25 (detailing selected FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012 requirements and the status of agency action in response 
thereto). 
 68. These rulemakings would define and establish broad registration, 
licensing, and safety standards. See Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 
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in drones to the national airspace system.69 Regarding public 
unmanned aircraft systems,70 a separate section requires the 
FAA to expedite the issuance of certificates of authorization, 
collaborate with agencies to open airspace, and generally simplify 
the process for permitting agencies to use drones.71 
Congress also required the Agency to develop an integration 
roadmap by February 2013 and make further rulemakings for 
small unmanned systems and an updated program integrating 
unmanned aircraft into the airspace environment.72 But safety— 
                                                                                                     
73–74 (outlining the standards for drone registration). 
 69. See id. § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 73 (describing the phased-in approach to 
drone integration into the national airspace system). 
 70. “The term ‘public unmanned aircraft system’ means an unmanned 
aircraft system that meets the qualifications and conditions required for 
operation of a public aircraft (as defined in section 40102 of title 49, United 
States Code).” Id. § 331 (a)(1), 126 Stat. at 72. That section of title 49 states, in 
relevant part: 
(41) “public aircraft” means any of the following: 
(A) Except with respect to an aircraft described in subparagraph (E), 
an aircraft used only for the United States Government, except as 
provided in section 40125(b). 
(B) An aircraft owned by the Government and operated by any person 
for purposes related to crew training, equipment development, or 
demonstration, except as provided in section 40125(b). 
(C) An aircraft owned and operated by the government of a State, the 
District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States 
or a political subdivision of one of these governments, except as 
provided in section 40125(b) . . . . 
49 U.S.C. § 40102 (a)(41) (emphasis added).  
 71. See id. § 334(a), 126 Stat. at 76 (describing Congress’s mandate for new 
guidelines expanding the use of public unmanned aircraft systems). Section 334 
does state that the FAA should provide guidance “on a public entity’s 
responsibility when operating an unmanned aircraft without a civil 
airworthiness certificate . . . ,” but nothing in the act suggests that the 
responsibilities are privacy concerns. Id. § 334 (a)(4), 126 Stat. at 76. Congress’s 
goal appears to be that the FAA rapidly and safely introduce drone technology. 
See id. § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat. at 73. “The plan . . . shall provide for the safe 
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system 
as soon as practicable, but not later than September 30, 2015.” Id. (emphasis 
added). The word privacy does not appear in the Act’s mandate to the FAA 
regarding drones. Id. 
 72. See id. § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 74 (“Not later than 18 months after [its 
first report to Congress] . . . the Secretary shall publish . . . [rules covering] 
small unmanned aircraft systems[,] . . . [and] update . . . the Administration’s 
most recent policy statement on unmanned aircraft systems.”). This roadmap 
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not privacy—was the consistent focus of Congress’s 
requirements.73 This focus coincides with the FAA’s conception of 
its own role in the process.74 Congress thus charged the FAA with 
developing a safe and rapid integration of drones to the domestic 
sphere, without any initial framework addressing inevitable 
Fourth Amendment implications. 
B. Legislative Incentive to Operate Drones Without Restrictions 
The absence of privacy protections in the Reauthorization is 
conspicuous, considering the ease with which some measures 
could have been included.75 Congress’s intent may simply have 
been to confront privacy at a later date with separate legislation. 
But regardless of why privacy protections were not originally 
included in the Reauthorization, the effect is, in essence, to 
accelerate a speeding car toward an unfinished bridge. Whether 
that bridge can best be spanned by further congressional action, 
state legislative responses, or judicial reinterpretation is the 
subject of Part V.76 As it stands, Congress continues to pressure 
the FAA to meet legislative deadlines—some of which having 
                                                                                                     
has proven elusive. An FAA website updating the public on UAS initiatives 
makes no mention of the status of the required roadmap. See generally 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2013) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 73. See id. § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 73 (“[T]he Secretary of 
Transportation . . . shall develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the 
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems.” (emphasis added)). There are no 
fewer than 6 references to safety, and no references to privacy, in Section 332 of 
the Act, which outlines the integration process. See id. § 332, 126 Stat. at 73–75 
(outlining the desired integration process). 
 74. See FAA Fact Sheet, supra note 50 (“The FAA’s main concern about 
[drone] operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) is safety.”). 
 75. Congress could have easily required that the FAA keep an updated 
database of drone certificate holders. To date, the primary means for discovering 
which organizations operate a drone is to make a FOIA request. See Lynch, FAA 
Release, supra note 30 (describing the FAA’s most recent release of drone 
certificate holders). 
 76. See infra Part V (discussing legislative and judicial remedies to better 
protect citizens’ privacy). 
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already been missed77—and the Agency has been putting portions 
of its plan into action.78  
While the main portion of the FAA’s response to the 
Reauthorization is forthcoming, there will likely be an explosion 
of drone usage by interested parties, including law enforcement 
agencies.79 The Reauthorization will likely decrease 
administrative burdens to own and operate a drone, and 
therefore increase the market for creating new drones.80 
Irrespective of how Congress responds to the privacy problem it 
now confronts, increased drone operation by police may have 
significant legal consequences for courts applying Fourth 
Amendment principles because expanded drone use may change 
the calculus for determining when a search by drones has 
occurred.81  
                                                                                                     
 77. See GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at Highlights page (“FAA . . . 
has begun making progress toward completing [congressional] requirements, 
but has missed one deadline and could miss others.”). 
 78. See John Nolan, FAA Urged to Keep UAV Timetable for Test Sites, 
DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012, 3:03 PM), http://www.daytondailynews.com/ 
news/news/congress-urges-faa-to-stay-on-schedule-for-choosin/nP89J (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2013) (reporting on a letter from nine House members to the 
FAA’s interim administrator regarding delays in the FAA’s implementation of 
programs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The FAA 
responded that “[t]he agency is working to complete the proposal process for the 
six test sites as required by the 2012 FAA Reauthorization Act.” Id.; see also 
GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at 23 (describing how the FAA “has begun 
making progress toward completing [congressional] requirements, but has 
missed one deadline and could miss others”). 
 79. See FAA Fact Sheet, supra note 50 (describing potential drone interest 
from domestic parties). 
 80. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DRONES 
IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND 
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 1, 15 (2012) (describing the efficiency effects that 
increased drone usage would give their operators). 
 81. See McNeal, supra note 34 (“[D]rones might raise unique privacy 
concerns because of their ability to gather information from a particular 
‘vantage point’ which is distinguishable from the data we accumulate through 
our cellular phones or Internet searches.”). 
OVER YOUR HEAD, UNDER THE RADAR 1849 
IV. Messy Authority: Case Law’s Inconsistent Treatment of Aerial 
Observation 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Florida v. Riley,82 
California v. Ciraolo,83 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,84 
primarily govern the issue of whether aerial surveillance 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.85 Their 
inquiries are fact-intensive and closely decided. Each of these 
decisions also has its foundation in the seminal privacy case of 
                                                                                                     
 82. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(concluding that aerial observations, made by officers in a helicopter 400 feet 
above ground level, of the interior of a greenhouse located in a residential 
backyard was not a ‘search’ protected by the Fourth Amendment). In Riley, the 
Court considered the constitutionality of naked-eye observations made without a 
warrant by police from an altitude of 400 feet. Id. at 447–48. The police were 
looking for drugs growing in a greenhouse located within the defendant’s 
residential curtilage. Id. The Court determined that the defendant’s expectation 
that his property was free from aerial observation was not reasonable because 
the police aircraft was flying “in the public airways.” Id. at 450–51. The 
observation was therefore deemed not to be a search requiring a warrant. Id. 
 83. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (concluding that aerial 
observations made by a fixed-wing plane at 1,000 feet was not a search). In 
Ciraolo, the Court considered the constitutionality of naked-eye observations 
made by officers in a fixed-wing plane at an altitude of 1,000 feet above ground 
level of a fenced-in back yard within the curtilage of a home. Id. at 209. The 
Court doubted that, in 1967 while ruling on the Katz case, Justice Harlan 
“considered an aircraft within the category of future electronic developments 
that could stealthily intrude upon an individual’s privacy.” Id. at 215 
(quotations omitted). The Ciraolo Court therefore decided that the Fourth 
Amendment “does not require the police traveling in the public airways at 
[1,000 feet] to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked 
eye.” Id. 
 84. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (“We hold 
that the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from 
navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”). In 
Dow Chemical, the Court examined whether naked-eye-enhancing photographs 
of an industrial complex made from 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet above ground 
level on behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency were a search under the 
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 230. The Court determined that no industrial 
curtilage doctrine protected the complex from police observation like that of a 
private residence, and that the flights were made from the public airways. Id. at 
234–35. The Court decided that an industrial complex is more akin to an open 
field and is therefore validly subject to observation by those in the public 
airways. Id. at 239. 
 85. See McBride, supra note 25, at 642–46 (reviewing case law covering 
aerial observation by police). 
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Katz v. United States.86 When examined together, these cases 
reveal a need for reevaluation when it comes to how courts decide 
whether aerial observation constitutes a search. The Court’s 
habitual return to Katz for guidance suggests that it is not ready 
to abandon that decision’s foundational protection of reasonable 
expectations of privacy.87 As discussed in Part V below, a careful 
return to the holding of Katz may suggest a solution to the drone 
conundrum. 
A. Katz v. United States: A Starting Point for Drawing the 
Privacy Line 
In Katz, the police eavesdropped on the defendant while he 
was calling from a public phone booth with the door closed.88 The 
Court ruled that a Fourth Amendment search occurs “when the 
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that 
society recognizes as reasonable.”89 The Court rejected the 
government’s formulation of the issue, which attempted to center 
the Court’s focus on the degree to which a constitutionally 
protected area should be free from penetration.90 Instead, the 
                                                                                                     
 86. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967). In Katz, the police 
eavesdropped on the defendant while he was talking on the phone in a public 
phone booth with the door closed. Id. at 348–49. The Court ruled that a Fourth 
Amendment search occurs “when the government violates a subjective 
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” Id. at 361 (Harlan, 
J., concurring). The Court rejected the petitioner’s formulation of the issue, 
which attempted to center the Court’s focus on the degree to which a 
constitutionally protected area should be free from penetration. Id. at 350. 
Instead, the majority emphasized that the Fourth Amendment extends across 
trespass law to protect individuals, not places. Id. at 351; see also Riley, 488 U.S. 
at 449 (citing the Ciraolo and Katz decisions for their influence on Fourth 
Amendment privacy law); Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 230, 234 (same); Ciraolo, 
476 U.S. at 211–15 (citing Katz repeatedly for its influence and guidance on 
Fourth Amendment privacy law). 
 87. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing Katz and the use 
of Katz by other courts in aerial observation cases). 
 88. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52 (describing the defendant’s actions). 
 89. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring). 
 90. See id. at 350–51 (majority opinion) (“We decline to adopt this 
formulation of the issues.”). Instead, the court went on to conclude that what a 
person reasonably “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at 351. 
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majority emphasized that the Fourth Amendment transcends 
trespass law to protect individuals, not merely places.91  
Justice Harlan provided a key clarification in his influential 
concurrence that, to determine how much protection is required, 
the court should consider the location where the alleged search 
occurs.92 The method of police observation is largely irrelevant.93 
Instead, a court should ascertain whether an individual’s 
expectation of privacy, under the circumstances, is reasonable.94 
As a practical matter, courts will likely label an individual’s belief 
as reasonable if it occurs in locations commonly understood to be 
private.95 Therefore, the “invasion of a constitutionally protected 
area by federal authorities is . . . presumptively unreasonable in 
the absence of a search warrant.”96  
The Court may never define an explicit list of constitutionally 
protected areas.97 But the individual’s location while under 
observation aids a court in its assessment of whether the 
individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable.98 Under this 
                                                                                                     
 91. See id. at 351–53 (stating that the trespass doctrine can no longer 
control Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). Somewhat famously, the majority 
opinion authored by Justice Stewart declared that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.” Id. at 351.   
 92. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring) (noting that, although the Fourth 
Amendment protects people and not places, the amount of protection afforded to 
those people requires reference to a place). 
 93. See id. at 362  (“[R]easonable expectations of privacy may be defeated 
by electronic as well as physical invasion.”); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A 
Blueprint for adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century 
Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1312 (2002) (describing Justice Harlan’s 
emphasis on the importance of the individual’s actions, and not those of the 
police). 
 94. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1967) (discussing the 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 95. See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J. concurring) (noting that, although the 
Fourth Amendment protects people and not places, the amount of protection 
afforded to those people requires reference to a place). 
 96. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring). 
 97. See id. at 351 (majority opinion) (“[The] effort to decide whether or not 
a given area, viewed in the abstract, is constitutionally protected deflects 
attention from the problem.” (quotations omitted)). 
 98. See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J. concurring) (emphasizing that the location 
of the individual, along with the actions taken by that individual to secure 
privacy, is a key factor for a court to consider when evaluating whether an 
observation was a search). 
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interpretation of Katz, courts look past the sometimes difficult 
problem of evaluating the intrusiveness of new police 
technologies.99 Subsequent courts should therefore focus on what 
actions the individual took and what degree of privacy he should 
have reasonably expected. But the Supreme Court failed to 
confirm this line of reasoning in subsequent aerial observation 
controversies during the 1980s. 
B. Missed Opportunities for Consistency 
The Supreme Court considered two cases in 1986 that 
partially delineate the bounds of reasonable expectations of 
privacy in aerial observation cases.   
In Ciraolo, the Court considered the constitutionality of 
naked-eye observations made by officers in a fixed-wing plane at 
an altitude of 1,000 feet above ground level of a fenced-in back 
yard within the curtilage of a home.100 The Court doubted that, in 
1967 while ruling on the Katz case, Justice Harlan “considered an 
aircraft within the category of future electronic developments 
that could stealthily intrude upon an individual’s privacy.”101 The 
Ciraolo Court therefore decided that the Fourth Amendment 
“does not require the police traveling in the public airways at 
[1,000 feet] to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible 
to the naked eye.”102 But Justice Harlan wrote that, in general, 
an individual need only exhibit a reasonable expectation of 
privacy to be protected from any government means of 
interference.103 Justice Harlan’s point was that the Constitution 
entitles the individual to protection regardless of the means 
                                                                                                     
 99. See Simmons, supra note 93, at 1312 (describing how Justice Harlan’s 
emphasis on the importance of the individual actions resolves difficulties courts 
may face in evaluating reasonable expectations). 
 100. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (describing the facts 
of the case). 
 101. Id. at 215 (quotations omitted). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“The critical fact in this case is that [one who occupies a phone 
booth] shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll . . . is surely entitled to 
assume that his conversation is not being intercepted.”). 
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employed against him.104 But the Ciraolo Court appears to, at 
least partially, slip past this nuance due to the difference in 
technology employed to intrude. 
In Dow Chemical, the Court examined whether photographs 
of an industrial complex made from altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, 
and 1,200 feet on behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency 
were a search under the Fourth Amendment.105 The Court 
determined that that no industrial curtilage doctrine protected 
the complex from police observation like that of a private 
residence, and that the flights were in public airspace.106 An 
industrial complex is more akin to an open field and is therefore 
validly subject to observation by those in the public airways.107 
The majority acknowledged that “[i]t may well be . . . that 
surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated 
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public . . . 
might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”108 
Therefore, Dow Chemical impliedly does not provide courts with a 
sufficient basis to permit drone over-flights of residential 
properties. 
But again, the Court grounded its reading of Katz on the 
position of the aircraft, one that was “lawfully in the public 
airspace immediately above” the complex.109 Both decisions (Dow 
Chemical and Ciraolo) thereby rested much of their evaluation on 
when, where, and how the observer conducted its surveillance.110 
Though Dow Chemical involved the use of precision cameras, the 
                                                                                                     
 104. See id. (deemphasizing the focus of the judicial inquiry on precisely 
what method the police had been using to observe the defendant). 
 105. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 230 (1986) 
(describing the facts of the case). 
 106. See id. at 234–35 (discussing the Court’s reasoning). 
 107. See id. at 239 (discussing the Court’s reasoning). 
 108. Id. at 238. 
 109. Id. at 238–39. 
 110. See id. at 239 (“We hold that the taking of aerial photographs of an 
industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by 
the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis added)); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
215 (1986) (concluding that aerial observations made by a fixed-wing plane at 
1,000 feet was not a search) (emphasis added). The Court could have instead 
focused its rulings on the activities of the individual under observation. 
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observations were of an industrial complex, not a residence.111 
Ciraolo explicitly involved a naked-eye police observation, and 
the rationale would strain to support a broader aerial scenario.112 
These cases missed an opportunity to reinforce a clear emphasis 
on the individual being observed and the setting in which he was 
observed. 
C. Florida v. Riley: An Increasingly Ineffective Application of 
Reasonableness  
In Riley, the Supreme Court decided to apply the same 
method-focused rationale, despite the use of a different aerial 
technology—police helicopters. This similar approach suggests a 
deliberate retreat from what could have been a firmer defense of 
privacy—an approach made and evaluated without regard to the 
surveillance technology employed.  
The Riley decision was badly split. The four-justice plurality 
concluded that an aerial police observation made “from a public 
vantage point where [the aircraft has] a right to be” does not 
require a search warrant so long as a reasonable man would not 
have “expected that his [curtilage] was protected from public or 
official observation.”113 This rationale leans heavily on whether 
the aircraft making the observation had a legal right to be where 
it was in the sky (pursuant to FAA regulations governing 
airspace).114  
Interestingly, a majority of the Court did not accept this 
rationale.115 Justice O’Connor agreed with the final disposition 
                                                                                                     
 111. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (“We 
hold that the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from 
navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 112. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (concluding that aerial observations made 
by a fixed-wing plane at 1,000 feet was not a search).  
 113. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–51 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 114. See id. at 451 (“We would have a different case if flying at that altitude 
had been contrary to law or regulation.”). 
 115. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy 
joined the plurality opinion. See id. at 447 (describing the plurality opinion’s 
supporters). 
OVER YOUR HEAD, UNDER THE RADAR 1855 
but differed in her analysis.116 Along with Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun, Justice O’Connor 
deemphasized the FAA regulations in any privacy analysis, and 
did not endorse the plurality’s analogy between helicopter 
observations and ground-level observations.117 These five Justices 
instead focused their judgment on the reasonableness of an 
individual’s expectation of privacy.118 This reasonableness 
determination is based on the circumstances of the case (such as 
where the individual was and what precautions the individual 
took to shield the property from public view).119 Justice O’Connor 
argued that the Court should “ask whether the helicopter was in 
the public airways at an altitude at which members of the public 
travel with sufficient regularity” and that “society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable,” regardless of technical compliance with 
FAA safety regulations.120  
Additionally, Justice Brennan’s dissent, as joined by Justices 
Marshall and Stevens, appears to anticipate a future technology 
that would be more intrusive than the helicopters of the 1980s.121 
He noted that the plurality appeared to dismiss the intrusiveness 
of the helicopter merely because it had a legal right to be where it 
was and due to the lack of “undue noise . . . wind, dust, or threat 
of injury”122 created by its presence. Arguing that the proper 
                                                                                                     
 116. See id. at 452 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I concur in the judgment[but] 
I write separately . . . to clarify the standard I feel follows from California v. 
Ciraolo.” (citation omitted)). Justice O’Connor wrote that the plurality rests the 
scope of its Fourth Amendment protection “too heavily” on whether the observer 
was complying with FAA safety regulations. Id. She argued instead that it is 
unreasonable “for persons on the ground to expect that their curtilage will not 
be observed from the air at 1,000 feet” because air travel at that altitude is a 
“sufficiently routine part of modern life.” Id. at 453. 
 117. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s 
reasoning). 
 118. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s 
reasoning). 
 119. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 453–54 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (describing the factors that a court should consider). 
 120. Id. (emphasis added). 
 121. See id. at 461–62 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (discussing why the legal 
position of the observing aircraft is unimportant when determining reasonable 
expectations of privacy). 
 122. Id. 
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analysis depends on safeguarding the privacy and security of 
private citizens, Justice Brennan asked the Court to “imagine a 
helicopter capable of hovering just above [the ground] without 
generating any noise, wind, or dust at all . . . . Suppose police 
employed this miraculous tool to discover not only what crops 
people were growing . . . but also what books they were 
reading.”123 This hypothetical is quite similar to the capabilities 
possessed by certain modern high-tech drones.124 The dissent 
thus addresses a model approach for the Supreme Court to take 
when applying aerial observation law to drones precisely because 
it imagines the potential abuse of the plurality’s emphasis on the 
location of the observing aircraft.  
Courts may decide to break from present case law because of 
the differences between helicopter and manned aircraft compared 
with unmanned drones.125 These cases may not apply to 
observations made from aircraft using cameras that enhance 
sensory abilities—as would be the case with most drones—
because such an observation loses any tenable comparison to the 
proverbial policeman on a public street.126 At some point, the 
analogy loses its credence in the face of an overly piercing spy 
technology, at least if some degree of privacy is to be retained. 
When technology emerges that fundamentally alters the privacy 
analysis, change becomes appropriate.127 Drones may very well be 
the line in the sand. 
                                                                                                     
 123. Id. at 462–63. 
 124. See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text (discussing the 
capabilities possessed by certain modern high-tech drones). 
 125. See Eyes in the Sky: The Domestic Use of Unmanned Aerial Sys., 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec. and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter 
UAS Hearing], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/hear_ 
05172013.html (statement of Tracey Maclin, Boston University School of Law) 
(discussing the inapplicability of much of current aerial observation precedent to 
drone operations). 
 126. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–51 (1989) (describing the 
policeman on the public street analogy). 
 127. See id. at 462–63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the 
Riley plurality would maintain its position if a hypothetical—and very drone-
like—technology existed that could circumvent reasonable expectations of 
privacy). 
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Even if the aerial observation cases apply to generalized 
drone operations, the precedent may be too muddied to permit a 
clean solution. As a consequence of Riley’s sharply divided 
reasoning, lower courts have applied the law intermittently.128 
Courts’ rulings on aerial observation cases in no fewer than nine 
states have applied one of four different approaches to existing 
Supreme Court precedent.129 Colorado and Oregon have used 
different approaches within their own jurisdictions.130 The Court 
of Appeals of Texas upheld a helicopter observation made from an 
altitude of 100 feet, a height that would likely not even pass 
Riley’s emphasis on aircraft location.131  
There is either confusion as to what factors should govern, or 
a desire by courts to select their own methods.132 Either way, the 
lower-court confusion may eventually lead to additional 
challenges at the Supreme Court. The introduction and 
proliferation of a technology that tests the unstable basis of 
previous decisions is the perfect opportunity to resolve a lower 
court split and clarify the line in the sand, should the Court 
choose to accept such a case.  
                                                                                                     
 128. See State v. Bryant, 950 A.2d 467, 476–79 (Vt. 2008) (discussing the 
four different approaches state and federal courts are using to apply Supreme 
Court precedent).  
 129. See id. (discussing the four different approaches state and federal 
courts are using to apply Supreme Court precedent). 
 130. See id. (detailing some of the different approaches state and federal 
courts are using to apply Supreme Court precedent). 
 131. Compare Moss v. State, 878 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) 
(“[T]he helicopter then circled . . . . coming down to about 100 feet over three or 
four residences.”), with Riley, 488 U.S. 451 (plurality opinion) (“We would have a 
different case if flying at that altitude had been contrary to law or regulation.”). 
Flying an aircraft at 100 feet likely would contravene the FAA’s minimum safe 
altitude requirements, which mandate at least a 500 foot clearance of people or 
structures. See 14 C.F.R. part 91.119(c) (“[A]ircraft may not be operated closer 
than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.”). See also Henderson 
v. People, 879 P.2d 383, 391 (Co. 1994) (holding that the provision of a television 
news helicopter to police for purposes of warrantless observations at 500–700 
feet of defendant’s shed was not a search). 
 132. See Bryant, 950 A.2d at 476–79 (discussing different approaches of 
other state courts). 
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D. Kyllo v. United States133: The Importance of Sensory 
Enhancement 
The Supreme Court considered the issue of whether police 
use of a thermal imaging device constituted an improper 
residential search in Kyllo.134 Its ruling has potential implications 
in the context of emerging drone technology. The five-to-four 
majority held that the use of a sense-enhancing technology to 
view the contents of a home was a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.135 The case also discussed the 
appropriate interpretation of Katz under more modern 
circumstances.136 
The Kyllo majority rejected the contention that a passive 
collection of extra-sensory information emanating from the 
exterior of a home (without revealing intimate details of the 
interior) was reasonable.137 Instead, the Court determined that 
“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information 
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have 
been obtained without” physical, in-person inspection of a 
residence “constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the 
technology in question is not in general public use.”138 This 
statement effectively means that a naked-eye observation from a 
                                                                                                     
 133. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (deciding that the use 
of a sense-enhancing technology not in general public use to view the contents of 
a home was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). In Kyllo, 
the Court considered the constitutionality of warrantless observations made by 
police across the street from a residence using thermal imaging technology. Id. 
at 29. The Court gave great weight to the fact that the observations were of the 
home. Id. at 31. But the Court also included an ill-defined caveat that a search 
technology must not be in general public use for the subject’s expectation of 
privacy to remain reasonable, seemingly without regard to the location of the 
individual. Id. at 34–35. 
 134. See id. at 29 (“This case presents the question whether the use of a 
thermal imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect 
relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a ‘search’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 135. See id. at 40 (discussing the majority’s holding). 
 136. See id. (discussing the role of Katz in the context of thermal imaging 
technology) 
 137. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of 
Kyllo). 
 138. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
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public vantage point is likely not a search, while technology that 
improves observation beyond what an un-aided person can sense 
must be questioned further. 
The majority’s test in Kyllo tracks closely with Katz. Police 
are not required to “avert their eyes” from criminal activity.139 
There will always be close cases involving rapidly emerging 
technologies. But the majority’s test may not actually demand eye 
aversion.140 
Kyllo’s standard applies: (1) when there is an enhancement 
technology, (2) when the interior contents of a house could be 
ascertained through no other means, and (3) when a technology is 
not so prevalent as to defeat a reasonable individual’s expectation 
of privacy.141 An interesting question arises when one considers 
whether a drone is inherently a sense-enhancing technology 
(regardless of the onboard cameras or equipment). Arguably, a 
drone augments the user’s ability to collect sensory information 
by extending the operator’s visual and auditory capacities to 
previously impossible vantage points. But it is unlikely a court 
would adopt this reasoning because without any additional 
equipment (such as telescopic camera lenses, thermal imaging 
devices, etc.), drones provide no independent sensory 
enhancement. It remains to be seen whether courts will 
distinguish between images captured by navigational cameras 
onboard drones and those directed intentionally downward on 
their surveillance subjects. A court using Kyllo to evaluate the 
facts of a drone case may wish to distinguish between these 
different cameras. The closest analogue is, understandably, to 
helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft which are discussed in Part 
IV.A–C of this Note.142 Like those aircraft, they are more 
accurately a platform technology that carries sensory technology 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 140. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of 
Kyllo). 
 141. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (discussing the 
court’s test). 
 142. See supra notes 88–113 and accompanying text (discussing the 
technology in previous aerial observation cases). 
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on board.143 Therefore, the equipment carried by the drone should 
determine whether Kyllo applies.144 
Interestingly, the Kyllo test leaves open the possibility that 
the permissibility of using a particular technology can change 
over time. Widespread drone usage may have precisely that effect 
on the social conceptions of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy.145 Drones may someday share the same familiarity that 
the public apparently had with the small planes in Ciraolo and 
Dow Chemical.146 If so, the existing aerial observation cases 
would offer little constitutional protection because many drones 
would have the capability to remain at a legal altitude, yet also 
make observations far beyond the abilities of a manned helicopter 
or plane considered by Riley.  
The Court acknowledged that “[i]t would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance 
of technology.”147 As an example, the majority pointed to aerial 
observation cases.148 The Court wondered openly “what limits 
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of 
guaranteed privacy.”149 This statement acknowledges two 
important concepts—technological advances will continue to 
stress constitutional protections from undue searches, and the 
Court has a role in defining appropriate boundaries for those 
advances.150 As drones represent a major advance in technology, 
                                                                                                     
 143. See McBride, supra note 25, at 657–59 (discussing the capabilities that 
drones present as unique compared with other platform technologies such as 
helicopters). 
 144. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing 
technology any information . . . constitutes a search . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 145. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 865–67 (discussing the interaction of evolving 
technologies and society). 
 146. See FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST, supra note 61 (describing the FAA’s 
forecast of a wide variety of potential future commercial, public, and private 
uses for drones in America). 
 147. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001). 
 148. See id. (citing the Ciraolo and Dow Chemical decisions). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. (describing the tensions and duties of the court in privacy 
matters such as this). 
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the Court would therefore be well within precedent to adjust the 
rules accordingly. 
The dissent describes the privacy interest in Kyllo as 
trivial,151 and the state’s methods as unobtrusive, akin to 
assessing the volume level of sound emanating from the Katz 
phone booth rather than the conversation itself.152 But rather 
than regulating the manner of police invasion or the nature of 
content overheard, the question is whether an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy was disturbed.153 The 
information gathered by the police in Kyllo was not merely data 
regarding the presence or absence of heat.154 The police 
discovered relative heat in particular locations of the house, 
which led them to make inferences about the contents of the 
residence’s interior.155 The dissent’s analogy comparing heat to 
the volume in Katz would be more apt if the eavesdropping police 
in Katz had somehow tried to use the volume of the phone booth 
conversation to make an inference as to the defendant’s 
conversation.156 In fact, that would have presented a different 
issue for the Katz Court (and would resemble the issue actually 
before the Kyllo Court). 
                                                                                                     
 151. By “trivial,” the dissent meant to imply that the intrusion was minor 
because the passive collection of heat radiation did not actually penetrate the 
home’s interior. See id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“After all, homes 
generally are insulated to keep heat in, rather than to prevent the detection of 
heat going out, and it does not seem to me that society will suffer from [such] a 
rule.”). 
 152. See id. at 41–42, 50 (discussing the treatment of inferences as 
searches). 
 153. See id. at 32–33 (discussing the Katz Court’s reasoning regarding 
reasonable expectations of privacy). 
 154. See id. at 35 (challenging the Government’s arguments regarding the 
detection of heat). 
 155. See id. at 36–37 (discussing the treatment of inferences as searches). 
 156. See id. at 49–50 (“By contrast, the thermal imager here disclosed only 
the relative amounts of heat radiating from the house; it would be as if, in Katz, 
the listening device disclosed only the relative volume of sound leaving the 
booth, which presumably was discernible in the public domain.”). 
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E. United States v. Jones: New Potential for Change 
Supreme Court cases dealing with rapidly advancing 
surveillance technologies have divided the Court over how to best 
handle Fourth Amendment implications. In the recent case of 
United States v. Jones,157 five of the Justices expressed their 
considerable hesitation in the face of a cheap, newly widespread, 
and useful police surveillance technology—Global Positioning 
System (GPS) tracking technology.158 The Court examined 
whether a GPS tracking device mounted on the undercarriage of 
a suspect’s Jeep constituted a search.159 The four-justice plurality 
opinion authored by Justice Scalia looked largely to the property 
law of trespass to conclude there was a search, and a warrant 
was required.160 But Justice Scalia acknowledged, with caution, 
that “[w]e may have to grapple with . . . ‘vexing problems’ in some 
future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and 
resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for 
rushing forward to resolve them here.”161 Drone technology 
should present precisely this sort of nontrespassory search issue 
that could compel Justice Scalia and others to revive a more 
basic, Katz-like approach. For instance, in a recent and fiery 
dissent, Justice Scalia excoriated the Court for its allowance of 
                                                                                                     
 157. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“We hold that 
the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use 
of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search.” 
(quotations omitted)). In Jones, the Court considered the constitutionality of 
police placement and monitoring of a GPS tracking device affixed to the 
defendant’s vehicle. Id. at 948. The Court looked to the historical origins of the 
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 
953. The narrow majority rejected the concurrence’s application of an 
“exclusively Katz[-based] reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test,” instead 
concluding that Katz should be confined more to “[s]ituations involving merely 
the transmission of electronic signals.” Id.  
 158. See id. at 948 (discussing the facts of the case). 
 159. See id. (“We decide whether the attachment of a Global-Positioning-
System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of 
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a 
search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 160. See id. at 950 (“As explained, for most of our history the Fourth 
Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government 
trespass upon the areas . . . it enumerates.”).  
 161. Id. at 954. 
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unwarranted DNA collection for the purpose of cross referencing 
it against a database of incriminating samples.162  
In Jones, Justice Sotomayor opined that the unique qualities 
of a new technology should be evaluated to properly apply Katz 
analysis.163 GPS tracking technology presents a problem for 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because it is “cheap in 
comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by 
design, proceeds surreptitiously, [so] it evades the ordinary 
checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited 
police resources and community hostility.’”164  
Justice Sotomayor identified GPS technology as a “tool so 
amenable to misuse” that its unique attributes should be taken 
into account when evaluating applying Katz.165 Justice Sotomayor 
asked, somewhat rhetorically, “whether people reasonably expect 
that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a 
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at 
will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so 
on.”166 She implied they would not.167  
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones also noted that “science 
has brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a 
person’s privacy than the direct and obvious methods of 
                                                                                                     
 162. See Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1982 (2013) (“The Court hastens 
to clarify that it does not mean to approve invasive surgery on arrestees or 
warrantless searches of their homes. That the Court feels the need to disclaim 
these consequences is as damning a criticism of its suspicionless-search regime 
as any I can muster.”). With a message that drafters of police drone legislation 
would do well to remember, Justice Scalia wrote “[t]he Fourth Amendment 
forbids searching a person for evidence of a crime when there is no basis for 
believing the person is guilty of the crime or is in possession of incriminating 
evidence.” Id. If left unaddressed, drones are precisely the sort of technology 
that could make this kind of searching rampant. 
 163. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“[P]hysical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of 
surveillance.”). 
 164. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. at 956 (“I would also [question] the appropriateness of 
entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate 
branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth 
Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power.”). 
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oppression which were detested by our forebears and which 
inspired the Fourth Amendment.”168 He determined that the 
Constitution’s protections should adapt with technology.169 
Justices Sotomayor and Alito thus described the dangers of GPS 
technology that, almost word-for-word, could be applied to the 
capabilities of drones and the problems that widespread police 
surveillance employing drones would entail. If the Supreme Court 
views the threat of drone surveillance similarly, restrictions on 
unwarranted drone use could be forthcoming.  
V. Solutions: Closing the Privacy Gap 
The goal of any privacy rules should be to effectively and 
clearly balance the legitimate interests of law enforcement with 
the need to protect privacy and civil liberties against excessive 
government intrusion.170 This balance is not easily struck. What 
follows, then, is a list of possible remedies and suggestions that 
may begin to guard against inappropriate drone use by law 
enforcement. The most effective overall solution will likely 
emerge from multiple sources, because legislatures, courts, and 
agencies have varying functions, responsibilities, tools, and 
expertise. 
A. Protective Legislation 
Legislation will be important in protecting individual privacy 
in a variety of contexts, including the law enforcement setting.171 
                                                                                                     
 168. Id. at 959 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 169. See id. (“The Court argues—and I agree—that we must assur[e] 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted. But it is almost impossible to think of late 
18th-century situations that are analogous to what took place in this case.” 
(quotations and citations omitted)). 
 170. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 861 (“It is generally agreed that the general 
pragmatic goal of both constitutional and statutory law governing search and 
seizure is to create a workable and sensible balance between law enforcement 
needs and privacy interests.”). 
 171. See id. at 867–68 (discussing the value of legislatures as bodies that 
“enact generalized rules for the future”). 
OVER YOUR HEAD, UNDER THE RADAR 1865 
But Congress may not be able to effectively control law 
enforcement organizations not under its direct control.172 
Solutions must therefore emanate from many levels of 
government in order to preserve the effectiveness of drone 
technology’s many advantages and simultaneously guard privacy. 
1. Federal Legislation: General Recommendations 
To begin with, there are certain general principles that 
Congress should consider adopting. Legal author Troy Roberts 
has assembled a list of recommendations for legislative fixes that 
would plug many privacy holes.173 His proposed solutions include 
some of the following: 
1. Write plain language statutes requiring warrants for 
[Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)] searches. 
2. Focus efforts on nonvisual navigation and safety of 
flight technology. 
3. Require any UAVs to power down sensory enhancing 
technology when transitioning to the target of the 
warrant or other mission.  
4. Require logs of sensory enhancing technology use on 
all UAVs. 
5. Create exceptions for immediate warrantless 
observation requirements, such as criminal chases, 
fires, and chemical exposures. 
6. Establish an objective regulatory body to enforce the 
rules on operators.174 
In particular, Roberts’s third, fourth, and fifth recommendations 
would allay many general societal fears regarding drones because 
they would reduce police incentives to employ large numbers of 
drones for observational purposes.175  
                                                                                                     
 172. See infra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing case law on the 
topic). 
 173. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 517 (detailing proposed legislative 
solutions). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Recall that a major fear of increased drone use prompted by the recent 
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Brookings Institute fellow John Villasenor has added that 
federal legislation may be prone to over-reaching by containing so 
many privacy protections that legitimate police work will be 
impeded with little victory for privacy.176 In a recent article 
addressing drones and privacy, Villasenor describes one scenario 
where more stringent rules would stifle an otherwise critically 
important piece of criminal evidence: 
Suppose that a brutal assault that takes place on a sidewalk is 
captured on video by a government‐operated [drone] that 
happens to be monitoring traffic on the adjacent street. 
Suppose further that the video from the [drone] turns out to be 
the only available evidence that can identify the perpetrator. 
It would defy common sense if the police or prosecutors were 
barred by new [drone] privacy rules from making use of this 
information.177 
Villasenor therefore cautions that a blanket warrant requirement 
would be foolish.178 He instead argues for a more limited scope of 
legislated privacy protections targeting the data retention of 
drone images and mandating that police keep thorough public 
records of drone operations.179 
In addition to Roberts’s and Villasenor’s recommendations, 
police drones should be employed only on specific missions, not 
sent to scour a city for undiscovered crimes. At a minimum, this 
                                                                                                     
legislation has been concern by some that it will create an electronic blanket of 
police presence overhead. See Somini Sengupta, Rise of Drones in U.S. Drives 
Efforts to Limit Police Use, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/02/16/technology/rise-of-drones-in-us-spurs-efforts-to-limit-
uses.html?pagewanted=all (“To me, it’s Big Brother in the sky.” (quoting Dave 
Norris, a city councilman in Charlottesville, Virginia) (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 176. See Villasenor, supra note 21, at 511 (“It is far harder to [draft privacy 
legislation] without negatively impacting the use of [drone] in applications that 
raise few or no privacy concerns.”). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. (“Legislation that would include a blanket prohibition on 
governmental use of private UAS data in criminal investigations would also be 
ill advised.”). 
 179. See id. at 512 (“The best solutions are those that increase privacy 
protections without impeding reasonable, non‐privacy‐violating uses. Laws 
addressing data retention by government [drone] users . . . [along with those 
that] require law enforcement agencies to keep thorough records identifying the 
details of flight operations.”). 
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limitation would minimize the number of ethical quandaries like 
the one raised by professor Villasenor above. Despite its appeal to 
logic, Villasenor’s hypothetical seems to concede too much ground 
to the technical capabilities of drones. This same sort of logic 
would seemingly justify almost any form of invasiveness widely 
deployed in public spaces so long as the technical capability 
exists.180 But the legislature has the flexibility to customize its 
laws to address a unique technical threat while taking advantage 
of its unique capabilities.181 If political will permits passage of a 
drone privacy bill, the real challenge will be to carve out the right 
exceptions. 
Perhaps the best way to ensure that private citizens are not 
the subject of regular Fourth Amendment search violations—
from any source—is to incentivize police and prosecutors by 
restricting the availability of drone-collected evidence at trial.182 
                                                                                                     
 180. See id. at 511 (“If, in the example in the previous paragraph, the 
images of the assault on the street had been captured by a [drone] operated by a 
television station instead of by the government, it would make no sense to place 
them beyond the legal reach of investigators.”). Villasenor’s preferred route for 
privacy protection is to lean on a mosaic of narrowly-decided opinions. See id. at 
516 (“In combination, however, these rulings indicate that the Fourth 
Amendment is likely to provide significantly more protection from government 
[drone] observations than is commonly assumed.”). But this is a risky 
proposition, for there is already much lower court confusion in interpreting 
these doctrines. See discussion supra note 128 (describing circuit differences in 
the application of aerial observation cases). 
 181. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 871 (“Judicial rulemaking is limited by 
strong stare decisis norms that limit the ability of judicial rules to change 
quickly; in contrast, legislatures enjoy wide-ranging discretion to enact new 
rules. The difference favors legislatures when technology is in flux.”). 
 182. See id. at 882–87 (acknowledging the advantages courts have over 
legislatures in protecting privacy). Kerr describes two advantages that courts 
have over legislatures for crafting meaningful privacy rules in the face of new 
technologies: courts can make “cautious judgments on a case-by-case basis,” and 
courts can be better trusted to “serve the public interest” apart from the 
influence of special interest groups. Id. at 882. More importantly, Kerr notes 
that courts are the best body to “intervene in the area of criminal procedure 
because . . . legislatures don’t give a damn about the rights of the accused.” Id. 
at 886 (quotations omitted) (citing Donald A. Dripps, Essay, Criminal 
Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t 
Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
1079 (1993)). But courts are inherently limited in effectiveness by a judge’s 
familiarity with the technology at issue. Id. at 886. 
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This is probably best accomplished by legislation,183 but the 
courts can play a role in the process.184  
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should also be 
modified so that the normal inadvertent discovery standards 
would only apply when the drone is conducting a specific mission 
or action.185 In other words, the legislature should alter the legal 
evidentiary standards so that a court could not admit evidence 
gathered from a drone while it patrols the skies without a 
warrant. As described by Roberts, reasonable exceptions could be 
made for circumstances involving immediate public safety.186 
2. Federal Legislation: Specific Solutions 
The recently proposed Drone Aircraft Privacy and 
Transparency Act of 2013187 (DAPTA) would, if enacted, fill many 
critical privacy holes. The bill would amend the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 to provide guidance and 
limitations absent from that legislation regarding the integration 
of drones into the national airspace system.188 Acknowledging the 
“potential for unmanned aircraft system technology to enable 
                                                                                                     
 183. See id. at 871 (“Judicial rulemaking is limited by strong stare decisis 
norms that limit the ability of judicial rules to change quickly; in contrast, 
legislatures enjoy wide-ranging discretion to enact new rules. The difference 
favors legislatures when technology is in flux.”). 
 184. See id. at 882 (discussing the two primary advantages of courts: they 
are institutions that can “regulate interstitially, making cautious judgments on 
a case-by-case basis” and they can be better trusted to serve the public interest). 
 185. The inadvertent discovery problem is illustrated by the following 
example: “if police are permitted to conduct drone surveillance for a search and 
rescue mission and inadvertently observe a violation of criminal law or 
regulation, the evidence would not be admissible in a criminal prosecution.” 
THOMPSON, supra note 80, at 19–20. Roberts’s third suggestion would solve the 
problem. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 517 (“Require any [drones] to power 
down sensory enhancing technology when transiting to the target of the warrant 
or other mission.”). Thus the problem of requiring police to turn a blind eye to 
crime intrusively observed in the process of transit evaporates. 
 186. See id. (detailing the author’s recommendations to cover privacy gaps). 
 187. H.R. 1262, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 188. See id. (“To amend the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 to 
provide guidance and limitations regarding the integration of unmanned 
aircraft systems into United States airspace, and for other purposes.”). 
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invasive and pervasive surveillance without adequate privacy 
protections,” the bill presents a detailed series of findings and 
requirements that would severely restrict the ability of law 
enforcement to use drones as evidence-gathering machines.189  
For example, the Secretary of Transportation would first be 
required to carry out a study, in conjunction with other executive 
agencies, that will identify “any potential threats to privacy 
protections posed by the integration of” drones.190 The bill would 
constrain the Secretary of Transportation (and thereby, the FAA) 
from approving drone licenses for organizations, including law 
enforcement bodies, that do not comply with data collection 
requirements in the bill.191 Law enforcement agencies would have 
                                                                                                     
 189. Id. § 2(6). 
 190. Id. § 3.  
 191. Id. (“[T]he Secretary of Transportation may not approve, issue, or 
award any certificate, license, or other grant of authority [unless certain data 
collection and data minimization statements are made].”). These requirements 
would force police to operate drones in accordance with well-defined privacy 
principles. Id.  Under the bill, police must disclose of the following: 
(1) the individuals or entities that will have the power to use the 
unmanned aircraft system; 
(2) the specific locations in which the unmanned aircraft system will 
operate; 
(3) the maximum period for which the unmanned aircraft system will 
operate in each flight; 
(4) whether the unmanned aircraft system will collect information or 
data about individuals or groups of individuals, and if so— 
(A) the circumstances under which such system will be used; and 
(B) the specific kinds of information or data such system will collect 
about individuals or groups of individuals and how such information 
or data, as well as conclusions drawn from such information or data, 
will be used, disclosed, and otherwise handled, including— 
(i) how the collection or retention of such information or data that is 
unrelated to the specified use will be minimized; 
(ii) whether such information or data might be sold, leased, or 
otherwise provided to third parties, and if so, under what 
circumstances it might be so sold or leased; 
(iii) the period for which such information or data will be retained; 
and 
(iv) when and how such information or data, including information or 
data no longer relevant to the specified use, will be destroyed; 
(5) the possible impact the operation of the unmanned aircraft system 
may have upon the privacy of individuals; 
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to supply a data minimization statement before they would be 
permitted to operate drones for police purposes.192 The inclusion of 
these extra requirements for police is potentially significant, 
beyond the public notice provided by these reporting requirements. 
The bill explicitly interjects the authority of the Secretary of 
Transportation into the privacy considerations of drone 
operation.193 This potentially subjects law enforcement agencies to 
an extra layer of review and an extra forum to which people can 
bring their grievances. 
The bill also prohibits generalized surveillance, with 
exceptions made for exigent circumstances.194 Even in those 
exigent circumstances, however, documentation “justifying the 
exception” shall be submitted to the Secretary of Transportation, 
                                                                                                     
(6) the specific steps that will be taken to mitigate any possible 
impact identified under paragraph (5), including steps to protect 
against unauthorized disclosure of any information or data described 
in paragraph (4), such as the use of encryption methods and other 
security features that will be used; 
(7) a telephone number or electronic mail address that an individual 
with complaints about the operation of the unmanned aircraft system 
may use to report such complaints and to request confirmation that 
personally identifiable data relating to such individual has been 
collected; 
(8) in the case that personally identifiable data relating to such 
individual has been collected, a reasonable process for such individual 
to request to obtain such data in a timely and an intelligible manner; 
(9) in the case that a request described in paragraph (8) is denied, a 
process by which such individual may obtain the reasons for the 
denial and challenge the denial; and 
(10) in the case that personally identifiable data relating to such 
individual has been collected, a process by which such individual may 
challenge the accuracy of such data and, if the challenge is successful, 
have such data erased or amended. 
 192. See id. (detailing the bill’s technical requirements).  
 193. See H.R. 1262, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013) (“[T]he Secretary of 
Transportation may not approve, issue, or award any certificate, license, or 
other grant of authority [unless certain data collection and data minimization 
statements are made].”). 
 194. See id. (“Subsection (a) shall not apply in exigent circumstances.”). 
“Exigent circumstances” are defined as conditions that arise when “a law 
enforcement entity reasonably believes there is . . . an imminent danger of death 
or serious physical injury . . . [or] a high risk of terrorist attack by a specific 
individual or organization.” Id.  
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and the information acquired during the emergency would be 
minimized and deleted if unrelated to the exigent circumstances.195 
The bill would disallow the direct or indirect gathering of that 
evidence without a warrant.196 This is perhaps the most important 
aspect of the bill because it imposes resource costs (namely, time 
and money) on law enforcement agencies that will likely have the 
effect of reducing the number of drones in the air.197 Any bill with a 
realistic hope of controlling the use of such an inexpensive and 
nimble technology must impose these kinds of procedural 
impediments, the added benefit of which is to inform the public 
about how and when the government uses this technology. 
Finally, the bill articulates a comprehensive system of 
enforcement and remedies, including injunctive relief, and, in the 
case of intentional violations, treble damages.198 While it is 
unknown how many of these protections will survive the legislative 
process, in its present state the bill systematically addresses the 
most fundamental Fourth Amendment concerns raised by police 
drone use. This legislation, or another bill like it, would validate 
the notion that drones are different and deserve special safeguards 
because of their unique capabilities.199 In order to stay ahead of the 
                                                                                                     
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. (“[N]o evidence derived [from a public use drone operating under 
the exigent circumstances exception] . . . may be received in evidence in any 
trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, [etc.].”). 
Furthermore, as a general matter, no law enforcement agency may use a drone 
“except pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Id. 
 197. See supra note 17 and accompanying discussion (describing resource 
scarcity as a limitation on privacy abuses). 
 198. See id. § 4 (governing enforcement). Enforcement of the bill would be 
accomplished through a variety of avenues, including civil actions by states on 
behalf of their residents, a robust slew of private rights of action, enforcement 
by the FAA and the Federal Trade Commission, license revocation, and the 
reservation by Congress to enact new laws governing drone privacy. See id. 
(governing enforcement). 
 199. For example, drones may pose the same widespread danger as 
imperceptible GPS tracking devices. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing how GPS tracking 
technology presents a problem for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because it 
is “cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques” and it 
“proceeds surreptitiously, [so] it evades the ordinary checks that constrain 
abusive law enforcement practices: limited police resources and community 
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technology’s problems, substantial safeguards should be in place 
before drones’ widespread use. 
Another comprehensive bill introduced at the start of the 
113th Congress was the Preserving American Privacy Act200 
(PAPA). The bill contains many of the same provisions as the 
DAPTA bill.201 Key differences include PAPA provisions for: 
(1) written consent by surveilled individuals to incidental 
warrantless observation;202 (2) a broader warrantless observation 
exception for emergency situations that includes conspiratorial 
activities of organized crime and terrorism;203 (3) federal, state, 
and local prosecutorial reporting on the drone operations and 
warrants sought pursuant thereto;204 (4) administrative 
disciplinary procedures for intentional violations by officers and 
employees of the United States;205 (5) specific provisions protecting 
personal or familial activities from unwarranted private drone 
collection of visual, sound, and physical impression information;206  
                                                                                                     
hostility” (quotations omitted)). 
 200. H.R. 637, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 201. For example, both bills prohibit warrantless searches without some 
kind of court approval or exception applying, and both bills have provisions 
requiring the release of data minimization and usage statements. Compare id. 
at § 2 (§ 3119b therein) (“[A] governmental entity shall submit to the Attorney 
General a data collection statement . . . .”), with H.R. 1262, 113th Cong. § 3 
(2013) (“[T]he Secretary of Transportation may not approve, issue, or award any 
certificate, license, or other grant of authority [unless certain data collection and 
data minimization statements are made].”). 
 202. See id. (excepting information gathered when written consent from the 
observed party is obtained). 
 203. See H.R. 637, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (§ 3119c therein) (excepting 
“conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime”). 
 204. See id. (§ 3119e therein) (“In March of each year the Attorney General, 
an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General, or 
the principal prosecuting attorney of a State, or the principal prosecuting 
attorney for any political subdivision of a State, shall report to the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.”). 
 205. See id. (§ 3119d therein) (describing administrative discipline 
procedures for intentional violations of the act). 
 206. See id. (§ 3119f therein) (describing the private use of aircraft systems). 
The bill would make it unlawful to: 
[I]ntentionally operate a private unmanned aircraft system to 
capture, in a manner that is highly offensive to a reasonable person, 
any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical 
impression of a [sic] individual engaging in a personal or familial 
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(6) a general prohibition on armed drones.207  
Less comprehensive bills previously considered would have 
addressed constitutional privacy issues in a more limited (or 
vague) fashion; these shorter bills nevertheless indicate a desire 
by many members of Congress to limit the use of drones for law 
enforcement. They include the Preserving Freedom from 
Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012,208 the Preserving 
American Privacy Act of 2012,209 and the Farmers Privacy Act of 
2012.210 While almost any addition would beneficially supplement 
the deficient FAA Reauthorization, the privacy issues are 
complex and would be best served by a coordinated legislative 
effort.211 The most important part of any bill will be the degree of 
specificity that can be reached with regard to defining the 
protections it puts in place. Provisions with broader allowances 
for police drone usage might provide superior protection from 
abuse than more restrictive but loosely defined provisions. 
Overall, Congress should use its advantages over courts to take 
speedy action and make comprehensive and consistent rules.212 
                                                                                                     
activity under circumstances in which the individual had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or 
auditory enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical 
trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical impression 
could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or 
auditory enhancing device was used. 
 207. See id. § 2 (Section 3119h therein) (banning weaponized drones). 
 208. S. 3287, H.R. 5925, 112th Cong. (2012). The Senate version would have 
prohibited “a person or entity acting under the authority, or funded in whole or 
in part by, the Government of the United States” from using a drone to gather 
evidence pertaining to criminal conduct without a warrant. Id. § 3. 
 209. See H.R. 6199, 112th Cong. (2012) (providing for limitations on the 
domestic use of drones in investigating regulatory and criminal offenses). 
 210. H.R. 5961, 112th Cong. (2012). This legislation would have “prohibit[ed] 
the EPA from conducting aerial surveillance of agricultural lands unless the 
EPA has consent from the farmer, has provided public notice, or has obtained a 
certificate of reasonable suspicion from the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia.” See Thompson, supra note 80, at 19 (discussing H.R. 
5961). 
 211. See THOMPSON, supra note 80, at 19–20 (discussing legislative solutions 
to privacy issues surrounding the use of drones in law enforcement 
surveillance). 
 212. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 871 (“Judicial rulemaking is limited by 
strong stare decisis norms that limit the ability of judicial rules to change 
quickly; in contrast, legislatures enjoy wide-ranging discretion to enact new 
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Recently, the House Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and 
Investigations held a lengthy series of hearings on the subject of 
privacy solutions to police drones.213 Among the panelists were 
John Villasenor (Brookings Institution), Gregory S. McNeal 
(Pepperdine University School of Law), Tracey Maclin (Boston 
University School of Law), and Chris Calabrese (American Civil 
Liberties Union).214 Villasenor argues, both in his scholarly 
writing and testimony, that a judicial solution to the problem will 
have fewer legal consequences as compared with congressional 
legislation.215 This argument is misguided because judicial 
solutions are prone to inconsistencies.216 By contrast, panelist 
Calabrese advocated for legislative action because Congress is in 
the best position to swiftly effect change.217  
Congressional questions that seemed to imply that drones 
are just another tracking technology were met with disagreement 
by the panelists, who maintained that drones are not the same 
kind of danger; drones, they stated, may magnify bias and are 
directly intrusive, targeted surveillance. 218 The principal 
limitation of Villasenor’s court-based drone solution is that it 
ignores Congress’s favorable position to establish a standard that 
will preclude courts from rendering inconsistent privacy 
protections. Because the extent to which current Supreme Court 
aerial observation precedent can apply to police drone 
surveillance, waiting for a Supreme Court revision will take years 
(after many violations have occurred). New congressional 
                                                                                                     
rules. The difference favors legislatures when technology is in flux.”). 
 213. See UAS Hearing, supra note 125 (discussing the hearing). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. (statements of John Villasenor, Brookings Institution) 
(regarding his argument that the Fourth Amendment is capable of adequately 
protecting Americans’ privacy).  
 216. See discussion supra note 128 (discussing how judicial rulings can be 
prone to inconsistency). 
 217. See UAS Hearing, supra note 125 (describing his position on the best 
rulemaking vehicle to protect privacy). 
 218. See id. (statements of John Villasenor, Brookings Institution; Gregory 
S. McNeal, Pepperdine University School of Law; Tracey Maclin, Boston 
University School of Law; and Chris Calabrese, American Civil Liberties Union) 
(describing, in different ways, how drones are a unique privacy threat). 
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legislation that protects privacy could be passed in a matter of 
months. 
Without addressing drones directly, some aspects of existing 
federal statutes may be applicable to drones in a way that would 
limit their potential for abuse by law enforcement.219 For 
example, some courts have linked video surveillance techniques 
with hyper-intrusive search methods such as wiretapping and 
bugging, thereby recruiting an existing statutory regime to 
provide protection from a new source of abuse.220 Similarly, 
elements of federal wiretap statutes could be made to apply to 
certain drone surveillance.221 
Despite the attractiveness of a legislative answer to a 
congressionally exacerbated problem, there may be limits on how 
much protection Congress can actually mandate. Many law 
enforcement activities involve strictly state actors enforcing their 
laws, actions that may not be fully covered by federal privacy 
legislation.222 State officials cannot usually be compelled to 
enforce a federal program.223 Additionally, while Congress can 
                                                                                                     
 219. See THOMPSON, supra note 80, at 19 (“Additionally, Congress could 
create a similar cause of action for privacy violations caused by drone 
surveillance as contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2712, which creates a civil remedy for 
violations of the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and certain 
provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.”). 
 220. See United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(“Television surveillance is identical in its indiscriminate character to 
wiretapping and bugging.”). Since the Torres decision, “six other courts have 
accepted this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, with the effect [being 
that] the Title III [requirements] have become constitutionalized [at least for 
video surveillance].” Roberts, supra note 41, at 511. 
 221. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), (1)(b)(ii) (2008) (prohibiting the 
intentional interception of oral communications through the use of a mechanical 
device when the device transmits communications by radio). 
 222. For example, the Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance 
Act of 2012 limits its application to “a person or entity acting under the 
authority, or funded in whole or in part by, the Government of the United 
States.” S. 3287, 112th Cong. § 3 (2012). 
 223. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (striking down a 
federal law compelling state officials to execute elements of federal gun 
legislation). The Printz Court went on to declare that “[t]he Federal Government 
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular 
problems, nor command the States' officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved . . . such 
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our [constitution].” Id. 
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legislate changes to the federal rules of evidence and procedure, 
state legislatures must, in many cases, act to incorporate them 
into state law.  
3. State Solutions 
Because Congress may not be able to legislate privacy 
protections covering all state nor local drone activities, action by 
the states may in some cases be necessary to solidify privacy 
protection. Virginia and Florida state legislatures have already 
begun to consider and enact legislation that would severely 
restrict the use of drones within their borders.224 These state laws 
would have little effect on the federal government’s use of 
drones.225 Even so, preventing state and local police agencies from 
using drones in all but the most exceptional scenarios would 
constitute a major restriction on potential sources of privacy 
violations, and may ease fears of a ubiquitous police presence 
overhead.226 
                                                                                                     
Congress may, however, be able to partially circumvent this prohibition through 
controlling FAA’s licensing procedures (and denying drone licensing to 
organizations that do not abide by its wishes). 
 224. See Hunter Stuart, Drone List Released by FAA Shows Which Police 
Departments Want to Fly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, THE HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/08/drone-list-domestic-
police-law-enforcement-surveillance_n_2647530.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) 
(“A bill in Florida aims to ban police use of drones . . . with a few exceptions for 
cases of terrorism, imminent danger or for search warrants . . . [and] a bill that 
[would] . . . ban state and local agencies from using drones [recently] passed the 
Virginia General Assembly.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 225. As discussed in Part V.A.1, “bills like Virginia’s are little more than 
symbolic gestures, since ultimately it’s FAA that controls the airspace over the 
United States.” Id.  
 226. See Sengupta, supra note 175 (“To me, it’s Big Brother in the sky” 
(quoting Dave Norris, a city councilman in Charlottesville, Virginia) (quotations 
omitted)). 
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4. Municipal Solutions 
Similar to state action, municipal action can have local 
benefits to privacy protection. Charlottesville, Virginia, recently 
became the first city to restrict the use of drones by its police 
department in criminal cases.227 Seattle’s mayor also recently 
ended the efforts of that city’s police department to use drones 
after privacy advocates protested.228 The Berkeley, California, 
city council considered declaring its airspace off-limits to drone 
operations.229 
Until a more permanent legislative solution emerges, 
municipal actions will create a patchwork of protection from local 
law enforcement use of drones for surveillance. But the courts 
(specifically, the Supreme Court) have the ability to influence law 
enforcement action to a much broader degree.   
B. Judicial Remedies: Return to Katz or Enumerate a Drone-
Specific Test 
The Supreme Court may be the body best suited to fill 
constitutional gaps because it can articulate existing precedent to 
simultaneously protect legitimate uses of police drones and the 
Fourth Amendment’s protective integrity.230 After all, the Katz 
decision does not leave individuals inherently vulnerable to 
unwarranted drone searches; the Riley court’s application of Katz 
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does.231 Recall that the legal standards articulated in Ciraolo, 
Dow Chemical, and Riley were not designed with drones in mind, 
and they leave holes in their privacy protections.232 Moreover, 
their holdings are applied unevenly, even without the added 
complication of novel drone technology.233 These irregularities 
will become an issue in the case of drones because of their 
potential widespread use by law enforcement. 
In essence, the Riley and Kyllo pluralities, when taken 
together, might theoretically allow a continuous retreat of the 
line that delineates which private places police cannot invade.234 
As drones become more prevalent, the Supreme Court may be 
unable—or at least unwilling—to continue the Riley practice of 
giving legal weight to the physical position of an observing 
aircraft. The more that technology advances to become smaller, 
cheaper, and more discreet, the less protection citizens will find 
in a Fourth Amendment interpretation that rests the bulk of its 
evaluation on the methods used by police.235 Additionally, it is 
unclear what percentage of the population need use a technology 
in order for it to qualify under Kyllo as sufficiently common.236 
Evaluating reasonableness based (in part) on changing societal 
                                                                                                     
 231. See generally supra Part IV.A–E. 
 232. See generally supra Part IV.A–E. 
 233. See generally supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 234. This is a consequence of how these courts link reasonability to the 
methods of observation and public use of the technology. See Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (describing the test to determine when a search 
has occurred in cases of advanced technology); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 
449–51 (1989) (describing the position of the police aircraft as an important 
factor under consideration). But see Roberts, supra note 41, at 516 (“[T]he 
manned flight aerial observation cases, culminating in Justice O’Connor’s Riley 
concurrence, suggest that courts will protect the privacy of curtilage and 
residences from unmanned aerial observation.”). 
 235. See Simmons, supra note 93, at 1322 (“The inconsistencies created by 
considering the method of search only multiply as technologies become more 
sophisticated and courts struggle to find the correct analogy for any given 
surveillance method employed.”). 
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usage of a technology may be confusing for both the general 
population and police.  
But these vulnerabilities only exist as long as the thin Riley 
Court (or a like-minded) plurality continues to prevail.237 A 
return to an interpretation of Katz that ignores the method of 
police search would have many clarifying benefits.238 As a state 
court interpreting Riley reminds us, “[t]echnology has produced 
many and varied means of observation and surveillance. But the 
fact that something can be done does not make the doing of it 
constitutional.”239 Katz better protects basic and reasonable 
expectations of privacy largely determined by the actions of the 
individual seeking constitutional shelter.240 Though Katz may, at 
times, engage in a somewhat circular logic,241 the advantage of 
Katz is that it permits the judiciary to directly protect the 
homeowner’s “right to be let alone,” irrespective of the police 
technology employed to invade it.242 To avoid problems of circular 
logic, the Court must clearly articulate to lower courts how they 
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must determine whether the event, location, or information under 
observation deserves protection.243 
A return to Justice Harlan’s formulation of the Katz rule is 
the most substantial change the Court could make because it 
would apply irrespective of subsequent technological 
advancements in drones or any other surveillance platform.244 
While courts are slow to catch up to changing technology,245 a 
return to Katz’s method-irrelevant reasonability determinations 
would be an effective placeholder protecting society until they do. 
Many, however, have criticized Katz as an unworkable test, 
and a return to the Katz formulation may not solve all problems 
of judicial consistency.246 In the alternative to reemphasizing 
Katz’s simple formulation, other methods might yet stall the 
potential onrush of warrantless drone evidence in courts.  
As it stands now, a judge or magistrate would likely grant or 
deny a warrant after a case-by-case evaluation of the facts in 
order to determine whether a requested search is reasonable.247 
Where no warrant is obtained but drones are used, courts should 
use a more well-defined sliding scale approach to evaluate 
whether a search occurred.  
A useful judicial test in Fourth Amendment situations must 
“create a workable and sensible balance between law enforcement 
needs and privacy interests” and be relatively clear.248 If an 
explicit return to Justice Harlan’s formulation of Katz is too 
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vague or unworkable for the Court, it must act quickly to 
establish specific factors as a judicial test to achieve lower court 
clarity. In order to determine if a police observation made by a 
drone constitutes a search, courts should ask most of the 
following questions when evaluating a motion to suppress: 
1. Was the observation made by the drone accidental or 
intentional;249 
2. Were the police previously denied a warrant for the 
surveillance operation, but decided to proceed 
anyway;250 
3. Were sensory-enhancing technologies used to obtain 
the observations;251 
4. Did the aircraft operate at an unsafe altitude while 
making the observations;252 
5. Was there a physical breach of a property’s 
curtilage;253 
6. Was the duration of observation unreasonably long;254 
and 
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7. Did the subject of the surveillance take protective 
actions that indicated both a desire and a reasonable 
expectation that his conduct was private?255 
As factors accumulate in favor of the observation’s status as 
a search or non-search, the burden establishing the opposite 
result becomes more onerous. Each of the above elements will 
allow the courts to determine the extent of intrusion, and the 
needs of the state. The Court should attempt to firmly establish a 
score-like tabulation of factors that would permit evidence, 
trigger exclusion, or permit discretion.  
This approach would also allow the courts to respect existing 
precedent, and is modeled after Justice Sotomayor’s comments in 
Jones.256 More serious need for using drone evidence would be 
allowed to trump a trivial curtilage violation, thus avoiding some 
of the ethical quandaries posited by Professor Villasenor above.257 
This approach would still remain vulnerable to some circuit 
irregularities along with many of the flaws inherent in the 
current system. Ultimately, a workable judicial test is “more 
readily attainable . . . when technologies are stable,” unlike in the 
rapidly changing environment of drone aircraft.258 But at a 
minimum, this approach could slow the potential abuse of police 
drones as a practical matter until more comprehensive solutions 
emerge. 
Lastly, the Court could also rule that drones are per se sense-
enhancing technologies, regardless of the equipment contained on 
board, because of drones’ ability to put police in previously 
impossible positions of observation. This would have the effect of 
triggering Kyllo’s protections. But for reasons discussed above, 
that interpretation is not likely.259 
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VI. Conclusions: The Road Ahead 
Drones do not have to be feared. But the expanded law 
enforcement use of drones creates a complicated Fourth 
Amendment problem for many courts. People will likely continue 
to expect a high level of privacy in their homes, because the idea 
of home is closely intertwined with privacy.260 The persistent 
question has become this: will that expectation remain attainable 
as technology—much of it with fantastic potential to save lives 
and resources—advances inexorably?  
It is important to keep in mind that each time police have 
attained the technical ability to circumvent this privacy 
expectation, the law has not unraveled to permit unrestricted 
police observation of intimate domestic activity.261 Instead, the 
legislature and courts have worked together to accommodate the 
advances, thus preserving some level of privacy in the home. The 
same cooperation must be accomplished here. 
Before courts ever become involved, some solutions will likely 
originate from a number of federal, state, or local legislative 
bodies. These legislative measures will become an important fix 
for Fourth Amendment holes while aerial observation 
jurisprudence catches up with changing circumstances. Most 
importantly, Congress should pass a detailed, comprehensive, 
and enforceable law—the PAPA or DAPTA bills would be a 
significant start—that would reduce public anxiety about drones, 
inform the public about how and when the government uses this 
technology, and concretely protect Fourth Amendment liberties. 
Any bill with a realistic hope of controlling the use of such an 
inexpensive and nimble technology must impose procedural 
impediments that act to limit the appeal of widespread 
employment. The thought of police drones carries with it a 
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visceral Orwellian implication of “Big Brother” intruding where it 
ought not.262 That fear must not be ignored, lest it be realized. 
The elimination of drones hovering for extended periods of time 
without a targeted purpose may substantially abate public fears 
of a constant surveillance. People may be more inclined to 
support drones if they are cast in the role of a lifesaving 
vehicle.263  
The Supreme Court should also take the earliest opportunity 
to clarify its precedent on aerial observation issues. The most 
protective action it could take would be to return the law 
explicitly to the full protective potential of Katz. Barring that, the 
Court should develop a clearly articulable standard for analysis 
when drones are used by police without a warrant to gather 
evidence. Judicial clarity and consistency would help ease public 
fears about how police drones will be used in the future. Without 
these reassurances, the imaginations (and fears) of private 
citizens will likely run wild. 
The aerial observation cases remain important for their 
window into what kind of treatment the police’s use of drones 
would presently enjoy. But Riley, Dow Chemical, and Ciraolo are 
quite possibly less important strictly as legal precedent because 
each of the cases is highly fact-specific.264 The cases are more 
useful for understanding how the Supreme Court might act 
someday if confronted with a drone case. The Court will likely 
ask: (1) what is under observation; (2) who is observing; and 
(3) how is the observation made.265 A swing towards privacy is 
possible, but the Court must change its course by returning to the 
roots of reasonable expectations.  
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Unique threats to privacy may sometimes warrant special 
protection. The Fourth Amendment makes much of that 
protection possible, and successfully coordinated efforts from 
multiple branches of government may even make it likely. But 
privacy will never be inevitable. 
  
